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JUSTICE SCALIA FOR THE DEFENSE?
Joanmarie Haria Davolit

[T]he studies the Court cites in no way justify a
constitutional imperative that prevents legislatures and juries
from treating exceptional cases in an exceptional way-by
determining that some murders are not just the acts of
happy-go-lucky teenagers, but heinous crimes deserving of
death.'
In dissenting from the 2005 Roper v. Simmons decision that held
that imposition of the death penalty on juvenile defendants violates
the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Justice Scalia
continued to solidify his prosecution-oriented, law-and-order
reputation. 2 Widely considered to be one of the most politically
conservative Justices on the United States Supreme Court, many
believe that his ideology results and rulings are hostile to the rights of
criminal defendants. 3 Despite Scalia's reputation, the impact of his
decisions often benefits criminal defendants.
A large number of scholars have studied Justice Scalia's writings
and examined his judicial philosophy. 4 Some scholars have focused
on his background-upbringing, religion, and education-searching
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Associate Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. B.A., University of
Virginia, 1985; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1988. The author would
like to thank Judy A. Clausen, Gina D'Amico, Kassia Fialkoff, Shawn Friend,
Michael Lewyn, and Todd Petit.
Roperv. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 619 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 607-30.
See Joan Bisirupic, Supreme Court: Suspects Must Assert Right to Silence, USA
TODAY (June 24, 2010, 12:07 PM), http://www.usatoday.comlnews/washingtonl
judicial/201 0-06-0 l-supreme-court-miranda-rights_N .htm; Linda Greenhouse, In
Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,2007, at AI,
available at http://www.nytimes.coml2007/07/01lwashingtonlOIscotus.htm1; Adam
Liptak, Consensus on Counting the Innocent: We Can't, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2008,
at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.coml2008/03/25/us/25bar.htm1; Reuters,
Scalia Says He Sees a Rolefor Physical Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,2008, at
AI7, available at http://www.nytimes.coml200S/02/I3/usI13scalia.html.
See, e.g., George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE
L.J. 1297 (1990).
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for the origins of his viewpoint. 5 Others have focused on his political
beliefs and strong conservative attitude. 6 Justice Scalia has selfdescribed his judicial philosophy as adhering to the "original
meaning" of the Constitution and has defended his rulings with
historical evidence. 7 Most scholarship focuses on understanding the
method he uses to reach certain results. 8 In contrast, this article looks
at his jurisprudence from a different perspective: not to attempt to
understand why he reaches a certain result, but to understand what
impact his decisions have on the rights of criminal defendants.
Scholarship, legal writings, and popular media describe Justice
Scalia, to one level or another, as being prosecution oriented. 9 This
conclusion stems from his conservative political philosophy. As
several scholars have pointed out, "[i]n Fourth Amendment, Fifth
Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Death Penalty,
and Habeas Corpus criminal justice cases, 'Scalia consistently joined
the other conservative judges as a relatively dependable vote against
assertions of rights by criminal defendants. '" \0
Particular
significance is often attached to what is interpreted as Justice Scalia's
enthusiastic support for the death penalty. II
In contrast to his pro-prosecution reputation, his rulings often
positively impact the rights of criminal defendants. 12 Some scholars

5.

See id. at 1298-1300.

6.

Shawn Burton, Comment, Justice Scalia's Methodological Approach to Judicial
Decision-Making: Political Actor or Strategic Institutionalist?, 34 U. ToL. L. REv.
575 (2003).
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,40 (2001) ("(W]e must take the long view,
from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward."); Antonin Scalia, The
Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175,1183-85 (1989).
See, e.g., Burton, supra note 6, at 576.
Christopher E. Smith, The Constitution and Criminal Punishment: The Emerging
Visions of Justices Scalia and Thomas, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 593, 598 (1995) ("Among

7.

8.
9.

10.

11.

12.

the Rehnquist Court [J]ustices, Justices Thomas and Scalia are most hostile to the
rights of criminal defendants."); James Edward Wyszynski, Jr., Comment, In Praise
of Judicial Restraint: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 1989 DETROIT C.
L. REv. 115, 161 (1989) ("From the beginning of his appointment process,
commentators attempted to paint Justice Scalia as an extremist, a conservative judicial
activist, who was determined to undo all that the Court had accomplished with its
social agenda of the last quarter-century.").
Burton, supra note 6, at 585 (quoting DAVID A. SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH,
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF JUSTICE ANTON IN SCALIA 177 (1996)).
Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi McCall, Justice Scalia's Influence on Criminal
Justice, 34 U. ToL. L. REv. 535,549 (2003) ("[Justice Scalia's] commitment to capital
punishment may loom especially large in his decisions and opinions on the subject.").
See infra Part I.
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have begun to notice 13 and to explain these decisions through an
understanding of Justice Scalia's judicial philosophy.I4 Whether or
not such decisions compliment his overall judicial philosophy, in
many unexpected areas, Justice Scalia expresses himself as a strong
defender of the rights of the accused over the power of the
government.
This article examines criminal United States Supreme Court
decisions written by Justice Scalia: majority opinions, concurring
opinions, and dissents. Rather than analyzing the impact of Justice
Scalia's judicial philosophy or legal theory on his decisions, this
article examines the impact of Justice Scalia's decisions on the rights
of criminal defendants. Part I describes scholars who have analyzed
Justice Scalia's judicial theory and found that it has an unexpectedly
positive impact on criminal defendants. Part II examines all cases in
which Justice Scalia has written majority, concurring, or dissenting
opinions that favor the prosecution. Finally, Part III examines the
cases where Justice Scalia has ruled for the defense and finds that the
overall impact of Justice Scalia's decisions in a variety of areas has
been to the benefit of criminal defendants.
I. JUSTICE SCALIA SURPRISES SCHOLARS
Prior to his appointment to the United States Supreme Court,
Justice Scalia served as an appellate judge for the D.C. Circuit, where
he had a pro-prosecution reputation. I5 Shortly after he became a
member of the Supreme Court, scholars began to notice that his
conservative political ideology did not necessarily translate into
rulings that upheld police power over the rights of the criminal
defendant. 16 As early as 1990, four years after Justice Scalia's
appointment, Professor George Kannar posited that Justice Scalia did
not reach stereotypically conservative decisions and in some cases

13.

14.
15.

16.

See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The
Triumph ofJustice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GED. LJ.
183 (2005).
See discussion infra Part I.
Kannar, supra note 4, at 1321 ("Though his printed opinions as a circuit judge dealing
with criminal procedure issues are few, and the measure is a crude one, it is notable
that every one of his D.C. Circuit opinions dealing with criminal procedure-four
majority opinions and one dissent-supported the prosecution side.").
See, e.g., id. There are numerous articles and books that examine the foundation,
history, and definition of Justice Scalia's judicial philosophy. This article is limited to
an analysis of articles describing the impact of his judicial theory to the rights of the
criminal defendant.
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even wrote decisions that strongly favored criminal defendants 17:
"[I]t is the basic constitutional methodology he has adoptedcombining respect for stare decisis with a 'restrained' interpretation
of precedent and the Constitution's text-which so frequently, and
automatically, takes him to the defendant's side.,,18 Professor Kannar
focused on Justice Scalia's Catholic education, demanding
intellectual upbringing, and the social environment of his childhood,
and found that the combination of these elements led Justice Scalia to
embrace the original meaning of the Constitution. 19
Professor Kannar reviewed cases early in Justice Scalia's tenure on
the Supreme Court that surprisingly disfavored the prosecution. He
wrote that, contrary to expectations, Justice Scalia "strongly rejected
any appeal to a 'law and order' ideology as part of Fourth
Amendment decision-making,,20 and for double jeopardy analysis. 21
In an early indication of Justice Scalia's views on the [C]onfrontation
[C]lause, Professor Kannar noted that "Justice Scalia articulated a
surprisingly strong and absolute defense of what he saw as basic
Confrontation Clause principles.,,22 Professor Kannar found that
these unexpected results stem from Justice Scalia's adherence to his
judicial technique of original meaning, rather than from any political
agenda. 23
Some scholars, while describing Justice Scalia's pro-prosecution
bias, also recognize that his decisions do not always reflect a
commitment to conservatism. 24 Others have suggested that his
judicial philosophy makes him more neutral so that he does not favor
prosecution over defense or vice versa. 25 Clearly, there is suspicion
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.

See id.
Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1315-17.
Id. at 1327.
Jd. at 1338. Professor Kannar wrote,
Double jeopardy was not about common sense or law
enforcement policy or keeping bad people in places where they
could do no harm. As with the Fourth Amendment and the
[C]onfrontation [C]lause, in the law of double jeopardy, outcomerelated "policy" considerations simply had no role. The Court
should just learn to live with the unpleasant fact that, every so
often, adhering to the "rules" does create windfalls.
Id.
Jd. at 1330.
Id. at 1331.
Smith & McCall, supra note II, at 548 ("It should be acknowledged that Scalia's
commitments do not all lead inevitably to conservative policy outcomes.").
See Wyszynski, Jr., supra note 9, at 120, 144-45 (discussing the impact of Justice
Scalia's use of judicial restraint).
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that when Justice Scalia rules for the defense, he does so reluctantly
and against his own personal beliefs. 26
More recently, Professor Stephanos Bibas noted that Justice
Scalia's versions of originalism and formalism result in decisions that
may seem to benefit criminal defendants precisely because the
Constitution strongly protects such rights. 27 In examining Justice
Scalia's decisions concerning the Confrontation Clause and the right
to have juries make findings beyond a reasonable doubt, Professor
Bibas examined certain cases that show Justice Scalia's idealization
of the rights embodied in the Constitution to protect the accused may
likewise benefit some criminal defendants in the modern criminal
justice system. 28 However, Professor Bibas found that because the
current criminal justice system has turned so far away from jury
trials, the reality of Justice Scalia's rulings may give no practical
benefit to the large majority of criminal defendants who forgo a jury
trial and plead guilty. 29
When analyzing the Confrontation Clause,30 Professor Bibas found
that Justice Scalia's adherence to originalism successfully reinterprets
the Constitution in a manner that revives the right to cross-examine
witnesses in a meaningful way: "My point is not that the Clause is
limited to the particular scenario that the Framers had in mind.
Rather, that historical scenario illuminates the plain meaning of the
text (exclusion of out-of-court testimony), which in turn is what
governs today.,,3l By reversing a long series of cases that permitted
the admission of hearsay evidence that met a loose reliability
standard and resulted in conflicting applications, Professor Bibas
found that Justice Scalia's adherence to originalism allowed him to
reject decades of mistaken Supreme Court decisions while
simultaneously relying upon history to revive the Confrontation
Clause. 32
However, Professor Bibas argued that since few cases currently are
resolved through trial, originalism and formalism lack relevance in
26.

27.
28.
29.
30.

31.
32.

Burton, supra note 6, at 602-03 ("That is, Scalia's mechanistic method of
interpretation necessarily resulted in a ruling at odds with his personal beliefs,
specifically a distaste for criminal defendants.").
See Bibas, supra note 13, at 192.
See id. at 204.
See id. at 197, 199.
A landmark case concerning the Confrontation Clause, Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004), is discussed in greater detail below. See infra notes 247-64 and
accompanying text.
See Bibas, supra note 13, at 191.
See id. at 192.
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the modem sentencing process. 33 The Constitution not only protects
the criminal defendant from an oppressive government, but it also
protects the right of the people to participate in the criminal justice
system through the jury system. 34 As Professor Bibas explained that
"[w ]hile we normally speak of separating legislative, executive, and
judicial powers, juries also playa role in the separation of powers (or
checks and balances) in criminal procedure. By safeguarding juries
against judicial encroachment, the Constitution protects juries' power
to check judges, legislatures, and prosecutors.,,35 This juror right is
essentially the right of the u.s. citizen to participate directly in
government and overrule any of the three branches of governmental
powers being asserted against another citizen: the legislative branch
(by refusing to convict a defendant because a law as written by the
legislature is unjust), the executive branch (by refusing to convict a
defendant because the law as applied by the prosecutor against an
individual is unjust), and the judicial branch (by refusing to follow
the judge's instructions if they are unjust). The jury system is the
daily embodiment of self-government.
After describing Justice Scalia's exaltation of the power of the jury,
Professor Bibas asserted that juries have lost the position they once
held at the time of the Revolutionary War: "The disappearance of
juries undermines ... [the] idealized eighteenth-century rule in yet
another way. The eighteenth-century separation of powers is
anachronistic in twenty-first century criminal procedure-there are
hardly any juries left to protect.,,36 Because the overwhelming
majority of cases are resolved through a guilty plea rather than a
trial,37 Professor Bibas feared that "[b]y stretching originalism and
formalism beyond their limits, the Court over-reached and created an

33.

34.
35.
36.
37.

See id. at 195-97 (pointing out the impracticality of abolishing the practice of plea
bargaining given its modem day popularity, despite the fact that originalism may
suggest its abolition is constitutionally required).
Se.e id. at 195.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 196-97. Professor Bibas wrote,
Article III of the Constitution mandates that '[t]he trial of all
Crimes ... shall be by Jury,' giving citizen-jurors a non-waivable,
structural check on judicial and prosecutorial overreaching.
Unlike the Sixth Amendment, Article III is not phrased as a right
belonging to the accused. It was meant to be a right of We the
People to administer justice. . .. Yet, today, jury trials resolved
fewer than four percent of criminal cases.
Id.
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unworkable sentencing mess.,,38 Professor Bibas essentially argued
that trial rights are important to preserve, when and if a case actually
reaches trial. 39 However, because so many cases are resolved
through plea-bargaining, Justice Scalia's exaltation of the jury system
simply ignores the experience of the modem criminal defendant. 40
Professor Bibas's dose of reality (that juries do not resolve many
cases anymore) makes a compelling point: Justice Scalia's opinions
that seem to favor a criminal defendant may have the opposite
result. 41 However, dividing cases into trials and guilty pleas does not
fully reflect a criminal defendant's experience in the criminal justice
system. Even if ultimately resolved pursuant to a guilty plea, many
criminal cases involve multiple hearings prior to the guilty plea and
may include issues that are resolved during pretrial motions. 42 Issues
impacting sentencing may well be litigated in a large number of cases
that ultimately result in guilty pleas. Such litigation occurs during
preliminary hearings, motions to suppress evidence, and other
preliminary motions practice. 43 Additionally, Justice Scalia's rulings
concerning the Confrontation Clause likely benefit every single
defendant whose case involves cross-examination of witnesses during
any stage of the criminal process, not merely those cases that
ultimately are resolved by a jury trial. 44 Thus, Professor Bibas's
analysis of Justice Scalia's reliance upon originalism and formalism
does not fully illuminate the impact of his decisions on criminal
defendants. 45
II. JUSTICE SCALIA FOR THE PROSECUTION
Decisions involving criminal defendants receive much attention
from a wide audience that includes scholars, practitioners, and
media. 46 Justice Scalia's adherence to the original meaning of the
Constitution sometimes results in holdings that negatively impact the
accused, but such cases do not appear dependent upon any political
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 199.
See id.
Id. at 197-98.
See id. at 198 (discussing the impact of the Blakely decision on plea bargaining).
See Edward F. Shennan, The Evolution of American Civil Trial Process Towards
Greater Congruence with Continental Trial Practice, 7 TuL. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 125,
138 (1999).
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 10--17.1; FED. R. EVID. 104, 1101.
See Bibas, supra note 13, at 190--91.
See id. at 204.
See supra notes 3, 11, 16.
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agenda. 47 Three main themes emerge from Justice Scalia's decisions
that negatively impact criminal defendants: practicality, finality, and
deference to the Constitution's separation of powers. Because the
themes of practically and finality often overlap in his writings, they
are discussed together in this article. On the practical side, Justice
Scalia's decisions often rest on common-sense arguments, indicating
a suspicion that the rest of the Court exists in a lofty, idealistic world
far removed from reality.48 His desire for finality expresses his belief
that criminal cases need to end at some point, and that these cases
may ultimately result in the defendant serving a long sentence or
even being executed. 49 He admits that this is the price paid for
finality. 50 Additionally, Justice Scalia's insistence that the Court
remain within its constitutionally mandated role as interpreter, and
not author, of the law necessitates his use of historically based
arguments to support his decisions. 51

A. Death Penalty Cases
Justice Scalia's conservative and prosecution preferences seem
most pronounced in capital punishment cases. 52 However, a close
reading of Justice Scalia's rulings does not reveal a strong preference
for or defense of capital punishment. Instead, Justice Scalia makes
two broad points: (1) the death penalty was widely practiced at the
time the Constitution was ratified, thus the original intent of the
Constitution did not include abolition of capital punishment and (2)
the Supreme Court's reasoning in this area, instead of an exercise in
intellectual consistency and adherence to any particular theory of
Constitutional interpretation, is instead an attempt by the Justices
opposed to capital punishment to eliminate executions regardless of
47.
48.
49.

50.
51.
52.

See infra Part II.A-B.
See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332, 339, 341 (1999) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
See Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43 (1993). Justice Scalia writes for the majority and
finds that the 180-day time period under Interstate Agreement on Detainers (lAD) for
bringing Mr. Fex to trial on charges in another state did not commence until the
request was delivered to the court and the prosecutor of the detainer-issuing
jurisdiction. Id. at 52. In the Fex decision, Justice Scalia finds that picking a different
meaning for the word delivered makes no better sense, and while acknowledging that
unfortunate consequences may result, points out that the result is "no worse than what
regularly occurred before the lAD was adopted." Id. at 50.
See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 635-36 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995)).
See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 872-73 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also infra text accompanying notes 62-64.
See infra notes 55-58, 66, 82, 110-13 and accompanying text.

2011]

Justice Scalia for the Defense?

695

the fact that the death penalty clearly does not. violate the Eighth
Amendment. 53 In his analysis, Justice Scalia routinely exposes and
criticizes the inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and novel justifications
that the majority on the Court relies upon to strike down death
penalty laws. 54
Although since overruled, Justice Scalia has consistently asserted
the right of the government to execute defendants who were juveniles
at the time of the offense. 55 Justice Scalia dissented from the
majority's ruling in Thompson v. Oklahoma,56 which held that the
execution of a criminal defendant who was fifteen years old at the
time of the crime was unconstitutional. Justice Scalia also authored
the now overruled decision in Stanford v. Kentucky,57 which held that
the execution of defendants who were sixteen- and seventeen-yearold juveniles at the time of the offense did not violate the
Constitution. In so finding, Justice Scalia emphasized that the
Constitution gives the legislature the power to determine death
penalty eligibility. 58
In his dissenting opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma, Justice Scalia
reminded the Court of the role of the legislature and the limitations
placed on judicial authority:
We have in the past studiously avoided that sort of
interference in the States' legislative processes, the heart of
their sovereignty. Placing restraints upon the manner in
which the States make their laws, in order to give 15-yearold criminals special protection against capital punishment,
may well be a good idea, as perhaps is the abolition of
capital punishment entirely. It is not, however, an idea that
is ours to impose. 59
Interestingly, Justice Scalia does not endorse capital punishment or
the execution of juveniles as something that he personally favors;
rather, he asserts the rights of the individual state legislatures to
determine whether or not to have a death penalty and to determine
53.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

59.

See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 88-87, 93 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989), overruled in part by Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005).
See infra text accompanying notes 82-91.
See Stanford, 492 U.S. 361.
487 U.S. 815, 838, 859 (1988).
492 U.S. at 380.
Id. at 370-72.
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 877.
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age eligibility. 60 While some of his language may appear to endorse
executing juveniles, Justice Scalia's dissent results from his view that
the reasoning that underlies the court decision is flawed. Justice
Scalia scornfully dismissed the argument that juveniles are too
immature to understand the severity of murder: "It is ... absurd to
think that one must be mature enough to drive carefully, to drink
responsibly, or to vote intelligently, in order to be mature enough to
understand that murdering another human being is profoundly
wrong .... ,,61
In both Thompson and Stanford, Justice Scalia emphasized that
since the "evolving standards of decency" is one consideration in
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the best standard for what society
currently believes is decent is to examine the laws that are passed and
enforced.
The audience for these arguments, in other words, is not this
Court but the citizenry of the United States. It is they, not
we, who must be persuaded. For as we stated earlier, our
job is to identify the "evolving standards of decency"; to
determine, not what they should be but what they are. We
have no power under the Eighth Amendment to substitute
our belief in the scientific evidence for the society's
apparent skepticism. 62
Even these controversial and overruled pro-death-penalty writings of
Justice Scalia involving juveniles do not reveal that he personally
endorses the death penalty. Instead, what he endorses is the
constitutional idealism of self-government. He consistently objects
to any claims that judges know better than the citizenry. 63 Justice
Scalia believes that to override laws written by duly elected
representatives of the people and to replace them with judicial beliefs

60.

61.
62.
63.

Id. In fact, Justice Scalia himself has asserted that he has no preference for a death
penalty:
I take no position on the desirability of the death penalty, except
to say that its value is eminently debatable and the subject of
deeply, indeed passionately, held views-which means, to me,
that it is preeminently not a matter to be resolved here. And
especially not when it is explicitly permitted by the Constitution.
Baze v. Rees 553 U.S. 35, 93 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 377-79.
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"is to replace judges of the law with a committee of philosopherkings.,,64
Justice Scalia's majority opinions often involve technical
procedural issues.
Writing for the majority in Sattazahn v.
Pennsylvania, Justice Scalia found that neither the Double Jeopardy
nor Due Process Clauses bar the jury from considering a death
sentence on a retrial where a defendant appealed his conviction and
sentence of life imprisonment imposed by default because a jury
failed to agree on the sentence. 65 In refusing to extend the Supreme
Court's earlier ruling that defendants cannot be resentenced to death
after they were previously sentenced for life imprisonment,66 Justice
Scalia adhered to his belief that jury decisions must be deferred to-but only after a jury has made a fmding beyond a reasonable doubt.
And because the life sentence in Sattazahn was imposed by default
after the jury failed to reach a sentence and the defendant appealed
the conviction seeking a new trial, the prosecutor was free to seek the
death penalty again at the retrial. 67 In the Sattazhan decision, Justice
Scalia expressed no preference whatsoever for or against the death
penalty, but merely limited his analysis to the relevant legal
principles.
Justice Scalia has dissented in death penalty cases involving issues
of jury qualification, eligibility for the death penalty, and various jury
instruction cases. 68 In 1976, the Supreme Court held that the death
64.

65.
66.

67.

68.

[d. at 379.
537 U.S. 101, 116 (2003).
[d. at 10(H)9. "Since, we concluded, a sentence of life imprisonment signifies that
"'the jury has already acquitted the defendant of whatever was necessary to impose
the death sentence,'" the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a State from seeking the death
penalty on retrial." [d. at 106 (quoting Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 445
(1981)).
See generally id. (rejecting the argument that double jeopardy was triggered by the
prosecution seeking death on retrial after a default sentence of life imprisonment had
already been imposed).
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607-30 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(eligibility for death penalty); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 178-85
(1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) Gury instructions); Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719,
739-52 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) Gury qualifications). Although not a death
penalty case, Justice Scalia also dissented in a case designed to streamline and reduce
death penalty appeals. See Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 254-65 (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). In Hahn, the majority held that the Supreme Court had
jurisdiction to review a denial of application for certificate of appealability under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDP A). [d. at 253
(majority opinion). Justice Scalia's dissent argued that there was no right to appeal.
See id. at 264 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The purpose of AEDP A is not obscure. It was
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penalty did not violate the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution in
Gregg v. Georgia,69 which ushered in the modem death penalty era in
the United States. Gregg upheld a statutory scheme requiring
bifurcation in capital punishment trials: first, a hearing to determine
whether or not the defendant is guilty,70 followed by a separate
hearing to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to
death or life imprisonment. 71 The Court approved the process where
the jury makes an individualized decision based on aggravating and
mitigating factors in deciding whether a death sentence is appropriate
for a defendant at the sentencing phase. 72 Additionally, the statutory
scheme at issue offered an appeal to the highest court in the state to
ensure that the death penalty is proportionate in each case based on
the crime itself and the individual characteristics of the defendant. 73
One area in which Justice Scalia disagrees with the current
jurisprudence is the jury selection process in capital punishment
cases. 74 Potential jurors in capital murder cases typically undergo
more extensive voir dire than jurors in noncapital cases. 75 For
example, jurors are questioned about their opinion on the death
penalty and their ability to consider the option of a death sentence if
the defendant is convicted of capital murder. Known as the
Witherspoon 76 qualification or death qualification,77 the Supreme
Court suggested in 1968 that any potential juror who would never
impose the death penalty in any circumstance must be removed from
the jury for cause. 78 The juror must be removed because, in telling

69.

70.
71.

72.

73.
74.

75.
76.
77.

78.

to eliminate the interminable delays in the execution of state and federal criminal ...
justice system[s] produced by various aspects of this Court's habeas corpus
jurisprudence.").
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Id. at 163.

Id.
Id. at 193-95 ("[S]uch standards ... provide guidance to the sentencing authority and
thereby reduce the likelihood that it will impose a sentence that fairly can be called
capricious or arbitrary.").
Id. at 198.
See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 739-52 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that jurors should not be disqualified simply because they would always impose the
death penalty for capital murder).
Marcia J. Wilson, The Application of the Death Penalty in New Mexico, July 1979
Through December 2007: An Empirical Analysis, 38 N.M. L. REv. 255,263 (2008).
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 708 n.5 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("deathqualification").
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522-23 & n.21. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
stated,
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the court that he or she could never even consider imposing a death
sentence, the juror admits that he cannot follow the jury instructions
that require the juror to consider a death sentence. 79
Defendants responded with two arguments to counter death
qualification. First, the juror's right to serve on a jury was unfairly
limited as a result of this ruling.80 Secondly, because all individuals
who oppose the death penalty must be removed from the jury, then in
the interest of fairness, all jurors who would vote for death in every
case regardless of the facts should also be removed for cause during
death qualification. 81 While the Court has yet to rule on the issue of a
juror's constitutional right to serve on a capital punishment case
despite opposing the death penalty, the Court did rule on the issue of
jurors who would automatically impose death.
In Morgan v. Illinois, Justice Scalia dissented from the majority's
ruling that the Due Process Clause requires the disqualification of any
juror who would automatically impose a sentence of death in a
capital murder tria1. 82 In his critique of the majority's holding, he
argued that in order to reach its conclusions the Court must misread
precedent, ignore contradictions within its own reasoning, and take "a
great leap over an unbridgeable chasm of logic.,,83 He first

79.

80.
81.
82.

83.

[N]othing we say today bears upon the power of a State to execute
a defendant sentenced to death by a jury from which the only
veniremen who were in fact excluded for cause were those who
made unmistakably clear (I) that they would automatically vote
against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any
evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before
them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would
prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the
defendant's guilt.
Id. at 523 n.21. While Witherspoon did not explicitly require removal of a juror for
cause for refusing to impose the death penalty, "it is clear from ... the progeny of
Witherspoon that a juror who in no case would vote for capital punishment, regardless
of his or her instructions, is not an impartial juror and must be removed for cause."
Morgan, 504 U.S. at 728.
See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,424 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S.
38,45 (1980)) ("[T]he proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may
be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment. . . . is
whether the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of
his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. ''').
See, e.g., Adam M. Clark, An Investigation of Death Qualification as a Violation of
the Rights ofJurors, 24 BUFF. PUB. INT. LJ. I (2005).
See, e.g., Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 84 (1988); Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387,414,
583 A.2d 218,231 (1990); People v. Coleman, 759 P.2d 1260, 1269 (Cal. 1988).
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 739 (Scalia, 1., dissenting).
Id. at 740, 749-50.
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emphasized the Court's contradictory prior cases, which
simultaneously hold that the "Sixth Amendment (which is binding on
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment) does not require a jury
trial at the sentencing phase of a capital case,,,84 yet "[i]n a separate
line of cases . . . we have said that the exclusion of persons who
merely 'express serious reservations about capital punishment' from
sentencing juries violates the right to an 'impartial jury' under the
Sixth Amendment.,,85 Thus, Justice Scalia further demonstrated the
circular reasoning of the majority that admittedly does not rely upon
the Sixth Amendment but instead finds that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that "any sentencing jury be
'impartial' to the same extent that the Sixth Amendment requires a
jury at the guilt phase to be impartial.,,86 Although not a Sixth
Amendment ruling, the Court must rely upon cases interpreting the
Sixth Amendment in order to reach its conclusions. 87
After emphasizing the Court's flawed reasoning, Justice Scalia then
rejected the Court's conclusion that the Morgan holding is merely a
logical extension of Witherspoon:
Witherspoon and succeeding cases held that the State was
not constitutionally prevented from excluding jurors who
would on no facts impose death; from which the Court today
concludes that a State is constitutionally compelled to
exclude jurors who would, on the facts establishing the
particular aggravated murder, invariably impose death. 88
In Illinois, if aggravating factors are proven during the sentencing

phase of a death penalty case, a juror may vote for a death sentence
even if mitigating factors are also proven: "The people of Illinois
have decided... that murder with certain aggravators will be
punished by death, unless the jury chooses to extend mercy.,,89
Justice Scalia explained that even if a juror asserts during voir dire
that he would always impose a death sentence if aggravating factors
are proven, such an assertion does not violate Illinois law because the

84.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 740; see Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1990); Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-49 (1990); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376,385 (1986);
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986).
Morgan, 504 U.S. at 740 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,518 (1968)).
Id.
Id. at 727-28.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 751.
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law allows the juror to so decide. 90 Justice Scalia thus distinguished
between the Witherspoon-disqualified juror, who would never follow
the law,91 and the Morgan-disqualified juror who is in fact acting in
accordance with the death penalty process in Illinois.
Another area of litigation in death penalty cases concerns whether
or not defendants have the right to a jury instruction that informs
jurors of the parameters of a life sentence. 92 Because jurors may
incorrectly believe that a life sentence allows for parole after a term
of years,93 defendants subjected to a possible death sentence argued
that when the alternative to death is a sentence of life without parole,
due process requires that jurors should be given a jury instruction
with that information. 94 In Simmons v. South Carolina, the Supreme
Court agreed with the defendant and held that South Carolina "may
not create a false dilemma by advancing generalized arguments
regarding the defendant's future dangerousness while, at the same
time, preventing the jury from learning that the defendant will never
be released on parole.,,95 Basically a "truth in sentencing" result, the
Simmons case ensured that jurors who consider imposing a life
sentence will realize that the defendant will, in fact, spend the rest of
his or her life in prison. 96
Justice Scalia acknowledged that the majority's rule seemed
reasonable yet dissented because he believes that the Constitution
does not require that jurors be given a definition of a life sentence. 97
Justice Scalia found that the Due Process Clause neither mandates the
jury instruction nor was there evidence in the record demonstrating
that the defendant was sentenced to death because the jury feared
releasing Simmons on parole. 98 Instead, Justice Scalia found that in
requesting a death sentence the prosecutor relied on "the brutal
murder of a 79-year-old woman in her home, and three prior crimes
confessed to by petitioner, all rapes and beatings of elderly women,
90.
91.
92.

93.

Id.
Id. at 750-51.
See Kristie Ellison Shufelt, Recent Development, Kelly v. South Carolina: When
Parole Eligibility is a Matter of Life and Death, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1333, 1333-34
(2003); C. Lindsey Morrill, Note, Informing Capital Juries About Parole: The Effect
on Life or Death Decisions, 90 Ky. LJ. 465, 466-67 (2002).
William W. Hood, III, Note, The Meaning of "Life" for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect
on Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 VA. L. REv. 1605, 1624 (1989).

94.

Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 160-61 (1994).

95.

Id. at 171.
See id.
Id. at 184-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 180-81.

96.
97.
98.
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one of them his grandmother," and he was sure that the "sheer
depravity of those crimes, rather than any specific fear for the
future,,99 that resulted in the death sentence. In part, Justice Scalia
found that the majority's reasoning in Simmons is grounded in a
misunderstanding of the evidence considered by the jury and their
unsupported assumptions.
Indeed, Justice Scalia warned that because many other states do not
offer life without parole, forcing the jury instruction in South
Carolina might adversely harm a defendant elsewhere. 100 Justice
Scalia warned that prosecutors could then argue the possibility of
parole to jurors as another reason to impose the death penalty. 101
Coming from a Justice with a law-and-order reputation, this is an
uncharacteristically pro-defense, strategic perspective.
Justice Scalia consistently objects to the Supreme Court using the
Due Process Clause to develop special rules for death penalty
criminal procedure. In Shafer v. South Carolina,102 Justice Scalia
dissented from the majority's expansion of the Simmons rule.103 In
Shafer, the defense attorney and the prosecutor disagreed over
whether or not the issue of future dangerousness had been presented
to the jury. 104 The Court held that a jury instruction that defined life
as life without the possibility of parole must be given whenever
future dangerousness is at issue. 105 Justice Scalia again voiced his
concern that the majority was improvising rules for capital murder
without constitutional authority 106: "Providing such information may
well be a good idea (though it will sometimes harm rather than help
the defendant's case)--and many States have indeed required it. The
Constitution, however, does not.,,107 Essentially, Justice Scalia found
no constitutional power to develop special criminal procedure rules
applicable to death penalty cases 108 and warned that such rules may
ultimately harm criminal defendants. 109
99.
Id. at 181.
100. /d. at 183 ("Preventing the defense from introducing evidence regarding parolabilty is
only half of the rule that prevents the prosecution from introducing it as well. If the
rule is changed for defendants, many will think that evenhandedness demands a
change for prosecutors as well.").
101. Id. at 183-84.
102. 532 U.S. 36 (2001).
103. Id. at 55 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 54.
105. Id. at 51.
106. Id. at 55 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (citations omitted).
108. Id.; accord Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337-38 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia wrote,
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Justice Scalia's insistence that the Court limit itself to the power
described in the Constitution is highlighted in recent cases
concerning eligibility for the death penalty.11O In Atkins v. Virginia,
the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prevents the
execution of individuals with mental retardation. III Similarly in
Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that execution of criminal
defendants who were juveniles at the time of their offense violates
the Constitution. 112 In both cases, Justice Scalia wrote scathing
dissents. 113
In Atkins and Roper, Justice Scalia found unpersuasive the Court's
willingness to consider laws of other countries in applying the

Today's decision is the pinnacle of our Eighth Amendment deathis-different jurisprudence. Not only does it, like all of that
jurisprudence, find no support in the text or history of the Eighth
Amendment; it does not even have support in current social
attitudes regarding the conditions that render an otherwise just
death penalty inappropriate. Seldom has an opinion of this Court
rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its
members.

Id.
109. Shafer, 532 U.S. at 55 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). Justice Scalia joined Justice
Alito in his dissent and argued the following:
The Court today holds that the Eighth Amendment categorically
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of
raping a child. This is so, according to the Court, no matter how
young the child, no matter how many times the child is raped, no
matter how many children the perpetrator rapes, no matter how
sadistic the crime, no matter how much physical or psychological
trauma is inflicted, and no matter how heinous the perpetrator's
prior criminal record may be. The Court provides two reasons for
this sweeping conclusion: First, the Court claims to have
identified "a national consensus" that the death penalty is never
acceptable for the rape of a child; second, the Court concludes,
based on its "independent judgment," that imposing the death
penalty for child rape is inconsistent with '''the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'"
Because neither of these justifications is sound, I respectfully
dissent.
Id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
111. 536 U.S. 304,321 (2002).
112. 543 U.S. 551,578-79 (2005).
113. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 337-53 (Scalia, 1., dissenting); Roper, 543 U.S. at 607-30
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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"evolving standards of decency" aspect of the Eighth Amendment l14 :
"But the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate
'national consensus' must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a
footnote) to the views of assorted professional and religious
organizations, members of the so-called 'world community,' and
respondents to opinion polls.,,115 In Roper, Justice Scalia again
objected to the Court's consultation of laws of other nations when
interpreting the U.S. Constitution 116 : "Though the views of our own
citizens are essentially irrelevant to the Court's decision today, the
views of other countries and the so-called international community
take center stage." 117
Justice Scalia commented on the naivete of relying upon the claims
of other countries concerning their criminal justice systems, stating
that "the Court is quite willing to believe that every foreign nationof whatever tyrannical political makeup and with however
subservient or incompetent a court system-in fact adheres to a rule
of no death penalty for offenders under 18."118 Similarly, Justice
Scalia noted that many protections for criminal defendants are
uniquely American rightS. 119 Thus, the majority should be more
suspicious of the laws of other countries that may not be enforced in
those countries and may also be less favorable to the rights of

114.

115.
116.

117.
118.
119.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 346-48 (Scalia, 1., dissenting) ("Equally irrelevant are the

practices of the 'world community,' whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not
always those of our people."); Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("More
fundamentally, however, the basic premise of the Court's argument-that American
law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world-ought to be rejected out of
hand.").
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 622.
ld.
Jd. at 623.
Jd. at 624. Justice Scalia wrote,
[T]he basic premise of the Court's argument-that American law
should conform to the laws of the rest of the world-ought to be
rejected out of hand. In fact the Court itself does not believe it.
In many significant respects the laws of most other countries
differ from our law-including not only such explicit provisions
of our Constitution as the right to jury trial and grand jury
indictment, but even many interpretations of the Constitution
prescribed by this Court itself.
The Court-pronounced
exclusionary rule, for example, is distinctively American.
ld.
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criminal defendants 120 than the rights found in the United States
Constitution. 121
Once again, Justice Scalia did not express a personal opinion
supporting capital punishment. In fact, Justice Scalia appeared
perhaps even neutral on the topic itself: "There is something to be
said for popular abolition of the death penalty; there is nothing to be
said for its incremental abolition by this Court.,,122 Rather, Justice
Scalia objected to the Supreme Court replacing the opinion of the
citizens, as expressed through laws passed by popularly elected state
legislators, with the Supreme Court's own opinion. 123 Additionally,
Justice Scalia expressed his irritation that those opposed to the death
penalty are attempting to bring about its abolition, not by legislation,
but by making its imposition unlikely: "The heavily outnumbered
opponents of capital punishment have successfully opened yet
another front in their guerilla war to make this unquestionably
constitutional sentence a practical impossibility.,,124 In referencing
the "heavily outnumbered opponents of capital punishment," Justice
Scalia underlined his belief in the political system, where the popular
vote of elected officials results in the passage of laws voicing the will
of the people. 125 Thus, much of Justice Scalia's reputation for
120. Justice Scalia further notes other areas oflaw in which the United States is completely
at odds with those of most other countries:
The Court has been oblivious to the views of other countries when
deciding how to interpret our Constitution's requirement that
'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion' . . .. And let us not forget the Court's abortion
jurisprudence, which makes us one of only six countries that
allow abortion on demand until the point of viability.
ld. at 625 (citation omitted).
121. Jd. at 626-27.
122. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,353 (2002).
123. Roper, 543 U.S. at 607-08. Justice Scalia wrote,
In urging approval of a constitution that gave life-tenured judges
the power to nullify laws enacted by the people's representatives,
Alexander Hamilton assured the citizens of New York that there
was little risk in this, since "[t]he judiciary ... ha[s] neither
FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment." . .. What a mockery
today's opinion makes of Hamilton's expectation, announcing the
Court's conclusion that the meaning of our Constitution has
changed over the past 15 years-not, mind you, that this Court's
decision 15 years ago was wrong, but that the Constitution has
changed.
ld. (citation omitted).
124. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 185 (1994).
125. See id. at 178-80, 184-85.
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supporting the death penalty stems from what is presumed to be his
preference because of the results he reaches. However, his support is
not for the death penalty, but for the rights of the people to choose
their own laws.
While Justice Scalia routinely asserts the constitutional right of
individual states to retain the death penalty as a potential punishment
within the criminal justice system, his impact is minimized by the
small percentage of death penalty cases. The overall impact of
Supreme Court death penalty decisions is actually quite narrow, and
often limited to other capital murder cases. 126 For example, in the
majority of murder cases, defendants are not eligible for the death
penalty; 127 they simply have not committed a crime that is punishable
by death under the relevant state or federal statute. 128 Thus, because
murder is only a small percentage of all crime, and because very few
of those murders qualify as a possible death penalty case, then the
total impact of Justice Scalia's impact on criminal defendants is by
definition much narrower.
There are significant differences in death penalty cases that make
Justice Scalia's impact on death penalty jurisprudence seem wider
than it actually is. First, the majority of death penalty cases go to
trial-a much higher percentage than overall felony cases, where the
vast majority result in guilty pleas due to plea bargaining. 129 Thus, a
126. See Eric Tennen, The Supreme Court's Influence on the Death Penalty in America: A
Hollow Hope?, 14 B.u. PUBL. INT. L.J. 251, 257-67 (2005) (discussing specific death
penalty cases). Of course, the author realizes that saying a Justice rules for the
defendant in many areas, except capital punishment, is a little like saying, "[0]utside
of the killings, [Washington, D.C.] has one of the lowest crime rates in the country."
Judi Hasson, Mayor: D.C. Crime Rates Low, USA TODAY, Mar. 24, 1989, at A2.
Nonetheless, as discussed infra, there are many reasons to distinguish between capital
punishment and all other crimes in this assessment.
127. See Steven F. Shatz, The Eighth Amendment, The Death Penalty, and Ordinary
Robbery-Burglary Murderers: A California Case Study, 59 FLA. L. REv. 719, 724
(2007); see also Frank Green and Reed Williams, Many Factors Figure in DeathPenalty Cases, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Oct. 3,2010, at Local News, available at
http://www2.timesdispatch.com!news/2010/oct/03/exec03-ar-538839/
(suggesting
roughly one third of murder cases are eligible for the death penalty).
128. TRAcy L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2008-STATISTICAL
TABLES tbl. 1 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/ pdf/cp08st.pdf
(listing crimes punishable by death, by state).
129. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006 STATISTICAL TABLES 24
(2009),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf. "But only some of those tests are implicated in
prosecutions, and only a small fraction of those cases actually proceed to trial. ...
([N]early 95% of convictions in state and federal courts are obtained via guilty plea)."
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009) (citation omitted).
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competent defense attorney who represents clients accused of a
capital crime must read multiple cases in which Justice Scalia favored
the prosecution's argument over the defendant subject to the death
penalty. Certainly many of these death penalty decisions have impact
beyond death penalty cases; 130 even defense attorneys who never
represent a defendant charged with capital murder will be familiar
with such decisions.
Additionally, Justice Scalia's reasoning in juvenile death penalty
cases has been overturned, and he primarily writes dissents in many
other death penalty cases. 131 Even ifhis decisions stem from personal
animosity toward criminal defendants or personal support of the
death penalty, such decisions lack widespread impact.
B. General Criminal Cases

Justice Scalia has ruled for the government and against the
defendant in cases concerning issues of criminal procedure and the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. 132
1. Criminal Procedure

Justice Scalia's decisions in criminal procedure consistently apply a
strict construction approach to statutory interpretation,133 adhere to
the plain meaning of the words used by the drafters of the statutes,
and enforce procedural rules and deadlines. 134 Such an approach
sometimes benefits the prosecution and sometimes the defense,
depending on whether the rule of lenityl35 applies. In Deal v. United
States, the Court did not apply the rule oflenity because there was no
130. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596 (1978) (holding that jurors who clearly

131.

132.
133.

134.

135.

manifest that they cannot "abide by existing law" may be properly excluded from the
jury).
See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), overruled by Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005); see also, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 607-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337-54 (2002) (Scalia, 1., dissenting).
See discussion infra Part Il.B.l-3.
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293-97 (2008) (upholding the
PROTECT Act as not overly broad under the Fifth Amendment and as complying
with the Due Process Clause using a strict approach to statutory construction).
See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 186-87 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(refusing to reach the merits of the case because it was not a "final decision" and thus
not properly before the Court).
Rule of lenity is defined as "[t]he judicial doctrine holding that a court, in construing
an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments,
should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1449 (9th ed. 2009).
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ambiguity in the statute and thus allowed an enhanced sentence to
stand. 136
Particularly in cases involving procedural default, Justice Scalia's
decisions seem to ruthlessly apply rules without consideration for
mercy. 137 One example is Puckett v. United States, where Justice
Scalia wrote for the majority in holding that a procedurally defaulted
claim for violation of a plea bargain is subject to plain-error
review. 138 While the Government conceded the violation on appeal,
Justice Scalia noted that during the sentencing, Puckett's attorney
never objected that "the Government was violating its obligations
under the plea agreement by backing away from its request for the
reduction .... And he did not move to withdraw Puckett's plea on
grounds that the Government had broken its sentencing promises." 139
Although Justice Scalia recognized the severity of the Government's
behavior, he expressed vindication in the ultimate result:
It is true enough that when the Government reneges on a
plea deal, the integrity of the system may be called into
question, but there may well be countervailing factors in
particular cases. Puckett is again a good example: Given
that he obviously did not cease his life of crime, receipt of a
sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility would
have been so ludicrous as itself to compromise the public
reputation of judicial proceedings. 140

Justice Scalia strictly applied procedural default to produce this
result. 141
Yet Justice Scalia appeared unconcerned with the
unfairness of the government's plea agreement violation because of
his view that the defendant was ultimately to blame; the combination
of the defendant's failure to object with his continued criminal

136. 508 U.S. 129, 131-32 (1993) (holding that "conviction" within the meaning of the
statute refers to a finding of guilt by a judge or jury that precedes the entry of a final
'Judgment of conviction" and the statute does not require that a previous sentence
become final in order for an enhanced sentence to be imposed for the instant offense).
137. See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 421, 430 (1996) (holding that the
defendant's failure to make a timely motion under Rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure created a procedural default, and thus the Court had no authority to
grant a judgment of acquittal, despite the defendant's claim of actual innocence).
138. 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1428 (2009).
139. ld. at 1427.
140. Jd. at 1433.
141. /d. at 1428.
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behavior after the guilty plea was entered but before he was
sentenced. 142
Justice Scalia's interest in the process aspect of criminal procedure
leads him to prefer a system that promotes finality. In dissenting
from the majority in one case on the issue of appeal from a guilty
plea despite procedural default when there is a claim of actual
innocence, Justice Scalia acknowledged the emotional appeal of
being sure that only the guilty are convicted, even as he underlined
that impossibility:
It would be marvelously inspiring to be able to boast that

we have a criminal-justice system in which a claim of
'actual innocence' will always be heard, no matter how late
it is brought forward, and no matter how much the failure to
bring it forward at the proper time is the defendant's own
fault. But of course we do not have such a system, and no
society unwilling to devote unlimited resources to repetitive
criminal litigation ever could. 143
Here, his focus on a reliable, workable, and final process led him to
reject the defendant's claim.
Justice Scalia's preferences for stare decisis and adhering to the
plain meaning of the Constitution prompted him to dissent in Yeager
v. United States, a case involving the Double Jeopardy Clause. 144
The majority found that the jury's acquittal of the defendant on some
counts and inability to reach a verdict on others precludes retrial of
the hung counts. 145 In dissent, Justice Scalia stated,
Until today, this Court has consistently held that retrial
after a jury has been unable to reach a verdict is part of the
original prosecution and that there can be no second
jeopardy where there has been no second prosecution.
Because I believe holding that line ... is more consistent
with the Court's cases and with the original meaning of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, I would affmn the judgment. 146

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 1431, 1433.
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 635 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129 S. Ct. 2360 (2009).
Id. at 2362-63.
Id. at 2374 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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While Justice Scalia indicated a preference that the Court return to
the original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause,147 at a minimum
he objects to the expanded doctrine announced by Yeager. 148
2. Fourth Amendment
Justice Scalia's Fourth Amendment rulings have received particular
notice for their harsh impact on the rights of criminal defendants. 149
Although he does not consistently rule against criminal defendants, 150
decisions involving what constitutes probable cause and prescribing
the parameters of a search likely have wide impact. 151 Regardless of
the impact, much of Justice Scalia's pro-prosecution reputation
results from his ruling against the rights of the defendant in cases
involving search and seizure. 152
In 2006, Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in two Fourth
Amendment cases. In United States v. Grubbs, 153 Justice Scalia
wrote that anticipatory search warrants comply with the Constitution
as long as two conditions are met: "It must be true not only that if the
triggering condition occurs 'there is a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place,' . . . but
also that there is probable cause to believe the triggering condition
will occur.,,154 Anticipatory search warrants are signed by a
magistrate but can only be executed when and if the triggering
condition occurS. 155 The Court found such warrants valid and,
moreover, found that the triggering condition does not need to be
specified in the warrant itself.156 As Justice Scalia wrote, the Fourth
Amendment "specifies only two matters that must be 'particularly

147. Id. at 2371 ("This case would be easy indeed if our cases had adhered to the Clause's
original meaning.").
148. Justice Scalia expands on this point in Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, which upheld retrial
in a capital murder case. See discussion supra Part II.A.
149. See Gerald F. Uelman, Knock and Announce Violations After Hudson v. Michigan,
CHAMPION, Sept./Oct. 2006, at 62 ("Courts should be reminded of these tragedies
before they buy into Justice Scalia's characterization of the knock and announce
requirement as 'the right not to be intruded upon in one's night clothes. "').
150. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
151. See Jodi Levine Avergun, Note, The Impact o/Illinois v. Gates: The States Consider
the Totality o/the Circumstance Test, 52 BROOK. L. REv. 1127, 1127-30 (1987).
152. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
153. 547 U.S. 90 (2006).
154. Jd. at 96-97 (citation omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983».
155. Jd.
156. Id. at 99.
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describ[ed]' in the warrant: 'the place to be searched' and 'the
persons or things to be seized. ",157
In Hudson v. Michigan,158 Justice Scalia wrote the decision and
held that there is no remedy for knock-and-announce violations. In
Hudson, the officers only waited mere seconds before forcing their
way into a home to execute a search warrant. 159 Even though the
Court found that the knock-and-announce rule was violated, it also
found that the application of the exclusionary rule was not a remedy
for such a violation. 160 Noting the privacy and dignity issues that the
knock-and-announce rule was designed to protect, Justice Scalia
nonetheless recognized that the warrant was going to be served
however the police decided to enter: "What the knock-and-announce
rule has never protected, however, is one's interest in preventing the
government from seeing or taking evidence described in a
warrant." 161 Thus, because the government had a warrant to search
and seize, and because exigent circumstances would have suspended
the knock-and-announce rule anyway, the Court declined to extend
the exclusionary rule under these circumstances. 162
In Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues, Justice Scalia has
dissented in cases upholding a defendant's rights. In Ornelas v.
United States, Justice Scalia dissented from the majority's holding
that the court of appeals should have reviewed de novo the district
court's determination of probable cause to search. 163 Justice Scalia
found the de novo review to have practical difficulties that would
impose a heavy burden on the courts of appeals and would have
instead relied upon the trial court's discretion as the appropriate
standard of review. 164 Reviewing cases for abuse of discretion
promotes Justice Scalia's interest in finality of judgments because
such a standard is likely to prevent or limit appellate review in many
cases.
[d. at 97 (alteration in original).
547 U.S. 586 (2006).
[d. at 588.
[d. at 594.
[d.
"But ignoring knock-and-announce can realistically be expected
to achieve absolutely nothing except the prevention of destruction of
evidence and the avoidance of life-threatening resistance by occupants of
the premises---dangers which, if there is even 'reasonable suspicion' of
their existence, suspend the knock-and-announce requirement anyway."
!d. at 596, 599.
163. 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. [d. at 700-05.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
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In Georgia v. Randolph, Justice Scalia dissented from the
majority's holding that a warrantless search was unreasonable as to
the husband who was physically present at his home at the time of the
search and actively refused to consent even though his wife
consented to a search. 165 After criticizing the majority's opinion for
lacking historical integrity, Justice Scalia interjected reality into the
issue and made an argument more in line with contemporary feminist
theory166 than one might expect from a conservative judge:
Given the usual patterns of domestic violence, how often
can police be expected to encounter the situation in which a
man urges them to enter the home while a woman
simultaneously demands that they stay out? The most
common practical effect of today's decision, insofar as the
contest between the sexes is concerned, is to give men the
power to stop women from allowing police into their
homes-which is, curiously enough, precisely the power
that Justice Stevens disapprovingly presumes men had in
1791. 167
Justice Scalia made the practical point that police typically receive
domestic violence calls in which the victim is a woman. 168 If the
abuser is allowed to keep the police out of the home, the victim may
be further harmed once the abuser shuts the door on the police. 169 In
Randolph, the Supreme Court essentially broke a tie: two people with
equal rights to the home disagreed over whether the police could
enter. The majority found that the objection of the husband overruled
the consent of the wife. 170 While the majority sided with the rights of
the accused, it is Justice Scalia who reminded us that the
overwhelming majority of victims in domestic assault cases are
women.

165. 547 U.s. 103, 142-45 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of
Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 520
(1992) (discussing feminist theory on protection of women from their abusers).
167. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 145.
168. See id.
169. Id. at 127, 138-40 (Roberts, C.l, dissenting, joined by Justice Scalia).
170. Id. at 106 (majority opinion) (holding that while police may enter a house, any
evidence obtained will be suppressed when used against the objecting occupant).
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3. Fifth and Sixth Amendment
Justice Scalia wrote the majority OpInIOn in Brogan v. United
States, which upheld the constitutionality of imposing criminal
liability on a defendant for simply denying wrongdoing to
investigators in violation of a federal statute. 171 Addressing the Fifth
Amendment aspect of the case, Justice Scalia wrote that "[w]hether
or not the predicament of the wrongdoer run to ground tugs at the
heartstrings, neither the text nor the spirit of the Fifth Amendment
confers a privilege to lie.,,172 Thus, while a defendant is free to stand
silent and say nothing in response to accusatory questions, he will be
charged with a crime if he lies. 173 Justice Scalia's emphasis on the
fact that innocent persons would not find themselves having to
choose between lying and standing uncomfortably silent implies that
he is not concerned with the guilty criminal, only the innocent
accused.
In Sixth Amendment cases, Justice Scalia has dissented from
majority opinions involving codefendants' statements and ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. 174 In his dissent from the majority's
holding in Gray v. Maryland,175 Justice Scalia objected to the
extension of a rule requiring that the defendant's name be omitted
from a nontestifying codefendant's statement. 176 In Gray, the
defendant's name was removed from the statement and replaced with
blanks and the word deleted. 177 In finding that it did not fall within
the class of statements to which Bruton'sl78 protective rule applies,
Justice Scalia again interjected a real-world view into his dissent:
The United States Constitution guarantees, not a perfect
system of criminal justice (as to which there can be
considerable disagreement), but a minimum standard of
fairness. Lest we lose sight of the forest for the trees, it
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

177.
178.

522 U.S. 398, 399, 404 (1998).
Id. at 404.
See id.
See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1494 (2010) (ineffective assistance of
counsel); Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185,200 (1998) (codefendant's statements).
523 U.S. at 200.
Id.; Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968) (excluding evidence of
codefendant's confession incriminating defendant when codefendant did not testify
because it violates the Confrontation Clause).
Gray, 523 U.S. at 188.
391 U.S. at 137 (holding that a nontestifying codefendant's confession that implicates
a defendant is not admissible at their joint trial unless all references to the defendant
are redacted).
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should be borne in mind that federal and state rules of
criminal procedure-which can afford to seek perfection
because they can be more readily changed---exc1ude nontestifying-codefendant confessions even where the Sixth
Amendment does not. 179
By emphasizing that protections for criminal defendants stem not
only from the Sixth Amendment, but also from federal and state
rules, Justice Scalia expressed his preference that the Court refrain
from constitutionalizing procedural rules for criminal trials. 180
Justice Scalia again argued that the Constitution does not guarantee
a perfect system in his dissent from the holding in Padilla v.
Kentucky. 181
Defendant Padilla pled guilty to a narcotics
transportation charge without being warned by his attorney that he
was subject to automatic deportation despite the fact he was a fortyyear legal resident of the United States and served in the United
States anned forces during Vietnam. 182 Justice Scalia objected to the
Court's stretching of the Sixth Amendment to fit this admittedly
compelling case 183: "In the best of all possible worlds, criminal
defendants contemplating a guilty plea ought to be advised of all
serious collateral consequences of conviction, and surely ought not to
be misadvised. The Constitution, however, is not an all-purpose tool
for judicial construction of a perfect world .... ,,184 While Justice
Scalia acknowledged that the trial attorney gave inaccurate advice, he
would not have overturned the conviction because the advice
pertained to a collateral matter, deportation, which was not the
subject of the case for which the defendant was entitled to effective
assistance of counsel. 185
In Dickerson v. United States,186 the Court held that an act of
Congress did not have the authority to overrule Miranda v. Arizona 187
because the warning system required by Miranda was

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Gray, 523 U.S. at 204.
See supra Part II.A. (discussing how Justice Scalia repeatedly objects to the Court's
development of new procedures that apply exclusively to capital punishment cases).
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1494 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1477-78 (majority opinion).
See id. at 1494-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1494.
Id. at 1494-97.
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
384 U.S. 436 (1966) (noting that every person in police custody has the right to
remain silent, which must be substantially conveyed to the suspect before he can
knowingly and intelligently waive his right).
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constitutionally based. 188 Justice Scalia dissented, finding that
history, logic, and the Constitution compel overruling Miranda 189:
"The Court therefore acts in plain violation of the Constitution when
it denies effect to this Act of Congress.,,190 Because the Miranda
decision did not hold that the Sixth Amendment required warnings,
and subsequent cases clearly held that failure to warn a criminal
defendant pursuant to Miranda did not violate the Constitution, 191
Justice Scalia found that the Constitution requires the overruling of
Miranda:
I believe we cannot allow to remain on the books even a
celebrated decision-especially a celebrated decision-that
has come to stand for the proposition that the Supreme
Court has power to impose extraconstitutional constraints
upon Congress and the States. This is not the system that
was established by the Framers .... 192
The legislature is empowered with writing the laws, not the Supreme
Court. Since the Court overstepped its role by writing into law that
Miranda warnings must be given prior to a custodial interrogation,
Justice Scalia believed that Miranda should be overtumed. 193 This
result does not stem from an argument about the appropriate
warnings given to criminal defendants but from the appropriate
power that the Supreme Court should be exercising. 194
Justice Scalia authored two recent opinions that appear to
negatively impact the defendant's rights. Montejo v. Louisiana held
that neither the defendant's request for counsel at arraignment nor the
court's appointment of counsel invalidated a waiver to policeinitiated interrogation. 195 Recognizing that many criminal defendants
188.
189.
190.
191.

192.
193.
194.
195.

Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.
/d. at 448-50, 456 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Jd. at 446.

Justice Scalia wrote,
The Court concedes only "that there is language in some of our
opinions that supports the view that Miranda's protections are not
'constitutionally required.'" It is not a matter of language; it is a
matter of holdings. The proposition that failure to comply with
Miranda's rules does not establish a constitutional violation was
central to the holdings of Tucker, Hass, Quarles, and Elstad.
Id. at 454 (citations omitted).
Id. at 465.
Id.
Id.
129 S. Ct. 2079, 2086, 2092 (2009).
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are indigent, Justice Scalia indicated that the appointment of counsel
has become automatic in a number of states. 196 Therefore, requesting
an attorney is not an assertion that the defendant wants his attorney
before questioning begins: 197
When a court appoints counsel for an indigent defendant in
the absence of any request on his part, there is no basis for a
presumption that any subsequent waiver of the right to
counsel will be involuntary. There is no "initial election" to
exercise the right .... No reason exists to assume that a
defendant like Montejo, who has done nothing at all to
express his intentions with respect to his Sixth Amendment
rights, would not be perfectly amenable to speaking with the
police without having counsel present. And no reason exists
to prohibit the police from inquiring. 198
Montejo raises the concern that indigent defendants will have a more
difficult time proving that a request for appointment of counsel meant
that they did not want to speak with the police instead of merely
requesting an attorney for trial. 199 Those who hire private counsel
will undoubtedly expect the attorney to be an immediate barrier
between the defendant and every interaction with the police and the
prosecution. 200
Justice Scalia minimized those concerns and found that such
statements could still be challenged under the Sixth Amendmene0 1:
"If Montejo made a clear assertion of the right to counsel when the
officers approached him about accompanying them on the excursion
for the murder weapon, then no interrogation should have taken place
unless Montejo initiated it.,,202 Although Montejo decided a narrow
issue, it may have significant impact: indigent defendants are not
likely to share Justice Scalia's view that the relationship between
police and suspects is between equals, in which the suspect can easily
terminate the interview. 203 •
Equally of concern is Maryland v. Shatzer, where a defendant's
statements were ruled admissible after he asserted his right to silence

Jd.
Jd.
Jd.
Jd.

at 2083.
at 2086.
at 2086-87 (citation omitted).
at 2084.
200. See id. at 2095 (Stevens, 1., dissenting).
201. See id. at 2091-92 (majority opinion).
202. Jd. at 2091.
203. See id. at 2090.
196.
197.
198.
199.
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because there was over a two-week break in custody between the first
and second attempts at interrogation. 204 As a result, Mr. Shatzer's
statement, taken after he had once asserted his Miranda rights, was
not suppressed at his trial. 205 Yet the majority went much further than
merely finding Mr. Shatzer's statement admissible, holding that once
two weeks expire from the first interview in which the defendant
invoked his Miranda rights, police may then contact the defendant
again, re- Mirandize him, and then inquire if he wants to waive those
previously asserted rights. 206
Justice Scalia found that a break in custody lasting two weeks
would be long enough between the first time a suspect is asked if he
would like to speak with police and declines, and the second time he
is asked. 207 Justice Scalia wrote that "14 days .... provides plenty of
time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult
with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive
effects of his prior custody.,,208 In holding that police may once again
question a suspect fourteen days after he has asserted his Miranda
rights, the Court likely encourages the police to find a way to exploit
the rules, similar to the technique used when police had defendants
confess first, Mirandized them, and then have them confess again. 209
The Court's ruling in Shatzer invites similar police manipulation of
suspects and thus negatively impacts the rights of the accused. 2Io
Justice Scalia explained the historical relationship between the
judiciary and the grand jury system in United States v. Williams. 211
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia found that the circuit court
cannot interfere with the independence of the grand jury by writing
regulations requiring a prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to
it. 212 His opinion relied upon an historical explanation of the role of
the grand jury as well as precedent that other constitutional rules do

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

130 S. Ct. 1213, 1227 (2010).
Id.
Id. at 1222-23.
Jd. at 1223.
Id.
See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604 (2004) (striking down the police
department's practice of interrogating a suspect without advising them of their
Miranda rights, getting a confession, and then obtaining a Miranda waiver and having
the suspect recite his or her prior confession).
210. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1227 n.l (Thomas, 1., concurring) (noting different
techniques that police officers could use in an attempt to manipulate suspects).
211. 504 U.S. 36,47 (1992).
212. Id.at45,47.
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not apply to the grand jury.213 "In fact the whole theory of its
function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional
Government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the
Government and the people.,,214 While this ruling did not benefit
criminal defendants, Justice Scalia noted that the role of the grand
jury was to preserve power for the people instead of the
governmental authorities. 215 Justice Scalia also suggested that
"Congress is free to prescribe" rules requiring that exculpatory
material be presented to the grand jury but that the courts do not have
such authority. 216
In Mitchell v. United States, Justice Scalia dissented from the
majority holding that the Fifth Amendment prevents a sentencing
judge from drawing an adverse inference from the defendant's
silence during a sentencing hearing.217 The Court limited its ruling to
prevent a sentencing judge from drawing an adverse inference in
determining facts relating to the circumstances and details of the
crime. 218 Justice Scalia agreed that the Fifth Amendment allows the
defendant to remain silent at sentencing but found the majority's
holding historically inconsistent, unworkable, and ludicrous-in light
of the fact that the sentencing judge's entire role during sentencing is
to determine the facts and judge what sentence is appropriate for the
defendant. 219 Emphasizing the impracticality of the majority's
opinion, Justice Scalia indicated that the Court itself was embarrassed
by its own ruling:
Today's opinion states, in as inconspicuous a manner as
possible at the very end of its analysis (one imagines that if
the statement were delivered orally it would be spoken in a
213. ld. at 47-49. Justice Scalia wrote,
In United States v. Calandra, . . . a grand jury witness faced
questions that were allegedly based upon physical evidence the
Government had obtained through a violation of the Fourth
Amendment; we rejected the proposal that the exclusionary rule
be extended to grand jury proceedings . . . . [W]e declined to
enforce the hearsay rule in grand jury proceedings, since that
"would run counter to the whole history of the grand jury
institution, in which laymen conduct their inquiries unfettered by
technical rules."
Jd. at 50 (quoting Castello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956».
214. Jd. at 47 (citing Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960».
215. ld.
216. ld.at55.
217. 526 U.S. 314, 331 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218. ld. at 328 (majority opinion).
219. See id. at 338-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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very low voice, and with the Court's hand over its mouth),
that its holding applies only to inferences drawn from
silence "in determining the facts of the offense.,,22o
Since the ruling requires the "[sentencing] judge to avert his eyes
from the elephant in the courtroom when it is the judge's job to size
up the elephant,,,221 Justice Scalia predicted that the impracticality of
this ruling will produce more litigation attempting to understand what
the Court meant. 222
Justice Scalia wrote a wide variety of decisions that negatively
impact criminal defendants. 223 His original meaning approach to
analyzing the Constitution results in rulings that reflect the criminal
procedure status during the Revolutionary War Era. 224 Such an
approach may favor the prosecution, especially in death penalty
cases. 225 However, in areas of wide applicability that are commonly
prosecuted, Justice Scalia's decisions have had a hugely positive
impact on the rights of the criminal defendant.
III. JUSTICE SCALIA FOR THE DEFENSE
Justice Scalia's positive impact on the rights of criminal defendants
has been largely unnoted. Justice Scalia has authored a variety of

220. Id. at 339.
221. Id. at 341.
222. Id. at 340.
223. See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091 (2009) (holding that a criminal
defendant's request for counsel at arraignment does not give rise to a presumption that
a subsequent waiver of Miranda rights is invalid); Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61,
79 (2000) (holding that a prosecutor calling the jury's attention to the fact that the
defendant had the opportunity to hear all other witnesses testify and tailor his
testimony accordingly does not violate his right to be present at trial and confront his
accusers); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), abrogated by Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,574 (2005) (holding that imposing capital punishment on a
16- or 17-year-old murderer is not cruel and unusual).
224. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S, 36, 53-54 (2004) (applying an originalist
analysis and holding that the Confrontation Clause excludes testimonial hearsay
statements); United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512-14 (1995) (using an
originalist analysis to hold that a judge may not withhold any element of a criminal
offense from the jury); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991) (using an
originalist analysis and holding that a sentence that is not otherwise cruel and unusual
does not become unconstitutional because it is mandatory).
225. See Joan L. Larsen, Ancient Juries and Modern Judges: Originalism's Uneasy
Relationship with the Jury, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 959, 984-85 (2010) ("[V]iewed through
[the lens of an originalist], the death penalty, having been in the late eighteenth
century neither unusual nor considered cruel, is constitutionally permissible.").
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opinions in which the rights of the criminal defendant were upheld,
even against long-accepted prosecutorial procedures. 226 Justice
Scalia has authored both majority and dissenting opinions that favor
the criminal defendant, in areas of law including the Sixth
Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Double Jeopardy Clause.
Whatever his underlying rationale for these decisions, their impact
benefits every single criminal defendant.
A. Sixth Amendment
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence. 227

1. To Be Confronted with the Witnesses Against Him
Justice Scalia has long adhered to the text of the Sixth Amendment
in arguing for a strong defense of the right of the accused to confront
the witnesses against him. Early in his tenure on the Supreme Court,
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Cruz v. New York,
holding that the Confrontation Clause barred the admission of a
nontestifying codefendant's confession at Cruz's trial because the
confession was not admissible against defendant Cruz, only against
the codefendant. 228 Justice Scalia wrote that the factors that must be
considered for admission of the codefendant's statement were
identical to those announced in Bruton 229 ; "[T]he likelihood that the
instruction [to not consider the codefendant's confession against
Cruz] will be disregarded; the probability that such disregard will
have a devastating effect; and the determinability of these facts in
advance of trial. ,,230 Thus, the Court held that the confession by the
nontestifying codefendant could not be introduced at a joint trial,
226.
227.
228.
229.

See infra Part lILA.l.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
481 U.S. 186, 193 (1987).
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 125-26 (1968); see also supra note 178 and
accompanying text.
230. Cruz, 481 U.S. at 193 (citations omitted).
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even if the jury was instructed to disregard it and even if the
defendant's own confession were admissible. 231
In Cruz, Justice Scalia adhered to the text of the Constitution and to
the earlier Bruton decision that found the nontestifying codefendant's
statement to be "evidence" against the defendant even when it was
not admitted against him at all, but only against the codefendant. 232
Justice Scalia emphasized the fact that the jury would likely consider
the nontesifying codefendant's confession against the defendant and
noted that the defendant was likely objecting to the admission of the
codefendant's confession precisely because he is distancing himself
from his own confession 233 : "But in the real world of criminal
litigation, the defendant is seeking to avoid his confession--on the
ground that it was not accurately reported, or that it was not really
true when made.,,234 The inability of the defendant to confront the
nontestifying codefendant through cross-examination resulted in the
majority's ruling against the admissibility of such statements. 235
Particularly extraordinary considering the timing of the decision, in
Coy v. Iowa,236 Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion that
strongly protects the Confrontation Clause during an era when there
was widespread hysteria concerning child-sexual-abuse cases 237 and
various attempts were being made in the criminal justice system to
make testifying in a courtroom less upsetting and stressful for child
witnesses. 238 In Coy, the defendant was accused of sexually
assaulting two girls who were camping outside in a backyard tent. 239
Over the defense's objection, the trial court allowed a screen to
separate the defendant from the victims while they testified. 240 The
defendant could "dimly" see the girls, but they could not see him.241

23l.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

238.

239.
240.
24l.

Id.
Id. at 192-93.
See id. at 191-93.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 193.
487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
See, e.g., McMartin v. Children's Inst. Int'l, 212 Cal. App. 3d 1393 (1989) (discussing
alleged child abuse which occurred at a preschool in the city of Manhattan,
California).
See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (holding the necessary use of oneway closed-circuit television to obtain testimony of a child witness in a child abuse
case does not violate the Confrontation Clause).
487 U.S. at 1014.
Id. at 1014-15.
Id.
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The Court reversed his conviction and remanded the case because of
the Sixth Amendment violation. 242
Explaining the importance of the Confrontation Clause, Justice
Scalia stressed in the holding in Coy that "[t]his opinion is
embellished with references to and quotations from antiquity in part
to convey that there is something deep in human nature that regards
face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser as 'essential
to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution. ",243 Throughout his
subsequent Sixth Amendment decisions, Justice Scalia consistently
returns to this theme and to the history of the right to confront
witnesses.
In Coy, Justice Scalia emphasized that the Confrontation Clause
demands the defendant and the accuser be able to see each other
during the testimony, despite the fact that witnesses may be
traumatized by the courtroom experience: "That face-to-face
presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused
child; but by the same token it may confound and undo the false
accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult. It is a
truism that constitutional protections have costS.,,244 The costs Justice
Scalia referenced include the negative impact on the prosecution's
case. 245 In contrast, the criminal defendant benefits from this
decision. 246 Justice Scalia's description of the importance of face-toface confrontation demonstrates not only his commitment to the
original meaning of the Constitution, but also his ability to view
issues from both the prosecution and the defense perspective.
Crawford v. Washington continued Justice Scalia's movement to
return the Court to the original meaning of the Confrontation
Clause-one that is extraordinarily protective of the rights of the
Crawford held that even reliable hearsay, when
accused. 247
testimonial in nature, is inadmissible unless the defendant was
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witness pursuant to the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 248 In Crawford, the
Court rejected the decades of precedent following Ohio v. Roberts 249
that allowed judges to determine the admissibility of hearsay based

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 1022.
ld. at 1017 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)).
ld. at 1020.
See id.
See id.
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
ld. at 68.
488 U.S. 56 (1980).
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upon reliability factors. 25o Writing for the Crawford majority, Justice
Scalia expressed the accused's perspective, stating that "[d]ispensing
with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to
dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.
This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.,,251 Instead, the
Sixth Amendment prescribes that the defendant have the opportunity
"to be confronted with the witnesses against him.,,252 Justice Scalia
wrote that simply applying the right to confront accusers is the best
test for reliability of evidence. 253
In so deciding, Justice Scalia emphasized the absurd rulings that
resulted from the application of the former Ohio v. Roberts reliability
test, because "[w]hether a statement [was] deemed reliable
depend[ ed] heavily on which factors the judge consider[ ed] and how
much weight he accord[ ed] each of them. Some courts w[ ound] up
attaching the same significance to opposite facts.,,254 There was no
predictability or rational explanation for why some statements were
admitted pursuant to the reliability test and others were excluded. 255
Justice Scalia found such a result to be fundamentally unfair to the
criminal defendant. 256
Justice Scalia reminds us that the Framers feared the power of
governmene57 : "They knew that judges, like other government
officers, could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the
people .... ,,258 Justice Scalia articulated a concern held by modem
criminal defendants as well: the massive power of the government
Justice Scalia's
will override the rights of the defendant. 259
empathetic response to the plight of the criminal defendant, combined
with the fact that he did not express any concern about the adverse
impact of this decision on the ability to convict defendants, is what is
so surprising about his opinion in this case.
Finally, Justice Scalia concluded in Crawford that the best test of
the reliability of evidence is the framework designed by the drafters
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-69; Roberts, 488 U.S. at 66.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (emphasis omitted).
ld. at 42 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
ld. at 69.
ld. at 63.
ld.
ld. at 61.
ld. at 66 ("The Framers would be astounded to learn that ex parte testimony could be
admitted against a criminal defendant because it was elicited by 'neutral' government
officers.").
258. ld. at 67.
259. See id. at 56 n.7.

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
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of the Constitution. 260 The Sixth Amendment "commands, not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. ,,261 Justice
Scalia distinguished the admissibility of certain hearsay exceptions
from evidence that is testimonial in nature and therefore barred by the
Confrontation Clause 262 : "Where testimonial evidence is at issue,
however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law
required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for crossexamination.,,263 The issue left unresolved by Crawford was a
comprehensive definition of testimonial evidence. 264
Two years later, Justice Scalia had the opportunity to expand on his
definition of testimonial evidence. In Davis v. Washington, the Court
granted certiorari on two domestic violence cases; statements made
by the victim at the scene were admitted into evidence over the
defense's objection that the victim did not appear to testify and to be
cross-examined. 265 Domestic violence cases are notorious for having
reluctant witnesses, who are either too afraid of the defendant to
testify or who have reconciled with the defendant and therefore no
longer wish to prosecute. 266 In response to witness reluctance, courts
either routinely allowed the police officer to recount the witness
statements or, as in Davis, played recordings of the witness's
statement for the jury. 267
During these highly charged, emotional cases, Justice Scalia coolly
demanded Sixth Amendment confrontation, despite the difficulties
for the prosecution and that criminal defendants will likely be
acquitted for lack of evidence. Domestic-violence victims also argued
that the nature of domestic violence requires "greater flexibility in the
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

ld. at 67.
ld. at 61.
ld. at 56.
ld. at 68.
ld. However, Justice Scalia did give some guidance as to the meaning of testimonial
evidence:
We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive
definition of 'testimonial.' Whatever else the term covers, it
applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing,
before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police
interrogations. These are the modem practices with closet kinship
to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed.
ld.
265. 547 U.S. 813, 817, 828 (2006).
266. See Sarah Rogers, Note, Online Dispute Resolution: An Option for Mediation in the
Midst ofGendered Violence, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 349,367-68 (2009).
267. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 817 ("The relevant statements in Davis v. Washington, No. 055224, were made to a 911 emergency operator .... ").
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use of testimonial evidence [because domestic violence] is
notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim to
ensure that she does not testify at trial.,,268 Nevertheless, Justice
Scalia found that the Constitution prefers that the guilty go free rather
than convicting defendants who did not have the opportunity to
confront the witnesses against them. 269
Justice Scalia defined the terms and explained the difference
between testimonial and nontestimonial statements for purposes of
the Confrontation Clause:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of
police interrogation under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.
They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively
indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution. 270
Criminal defendants could not have found a more pro-defense
version of the definition of testimonial statements than this one
announced by Justice Scalia. Excepting the beginning sections of
emergency 9-1-1 recordings, virtually every statement to a police
officer investigating a crime becomes testimonial under this
definition. 271
Justice Scalia continued his defense-oriented interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause in Giles v. California, which concerned the
issue of forfeiture by wrongdoing272 and mentioned briefly in the
Davis decision.273 In Giles, the complaining witness had been killed
by the defendant prior to trial. 274 The issue for the Court was whether
the defendant's killing of the witness was enough for the defendant to
forfeit his right to object to admission of her former statement
concerning a prior assault charge or whether there had to be evidence
268.
269.
270.
27l.
272.
273.

Id. at 832-33.
See id. at 833.
Id. at 822.
See id.
554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008).
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 ("That is, one who obtains the absence of a witness by
wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation. We take no position on
the standards necessary to demonstrate such forfeiture .... ").
274. Giles, 554 U.S. at 357.
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that the defendant killed her to keep her from becoming a witness
against him. 275 Justice Scalia examined the common law rule of
forfeiture by wrongdoing and found that the prosecution must
demonstrate the defendant's intent prior to admission of such
testimony: "The terms used to define the scope of the forfeiture rule
suggest that the exception applied only when the defendant engaged
in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying.,,276
Justice Scalia emphasized that a straightforward application of the
defendant's Confrontation Clause rights demanded this result: "It is
not the role of courts to extrapolate from the words of the Sixth
Amendment to the values behind it, and then to enforce its guarantees
only to the extent they serve ... those underlying values."m In other
words, the Confrontation Clause requires that the defendant be given
the opportunity to confront the witnesses. Prior to the admission of
any nonconfronted statements against the defendant, the prosecution
must prove both that it is the defendant's fault the witness is
unavailable and that the defendant intended to make the witness
unavailable to testify. 278
Justice Scalia acknowledged the concern that the prosecution of
domestic violence cases may be more difficult as a result of this
ruling, but he nevertheless refused to return to the procedure of
having judges admit statements into evidence based on an Ohio v.
Roberts reliability type standard:
In any event, we are puzzled by the dissent's decision to
devote its peroration to domestic abuse cases. Is the
suggestion that we should have one Confrontation Clause
(the one the Framers adopted and Crawford described) for
all other crimes, but a special, improvised, Confrontation
Clause for those crimes that are frequently directed against
women? Domestic violence is an intolerable offense that
legislatures may choose to combat through many meansfrom increasing criminal penalties to adding resources for
investigation and prosecution to funding awareness and
prevention campaigns. But for that serious crime, as for
others, abridging the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants is not in the State's arsenal. 279

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 359.
at 375.
at 359-61.
at 376.
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Domestic violence cases fill many court dockets, and some
jurisdictions have developed family courts or other specialty courts to
handle the large number of cases. 280 These cases were routinely
prosecuted through the nonconfronted statements of witnesses who
did not appear to testify.281 Justice Scalia's opinion unconditionally
defended the rights of the criminal defendant in a situation that has
widespread impact in frequently prosecuted domestic violence
cases. 282
Expanding on his defense-oriented interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause, Justice Scalia wrote the opinion in MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts. 283 The Court held that routine laboratory
analyses of narcotics, which had long been introduced into evidence
by affidavit, were testimonial hearsay. 284 In order to introduce the
results of such testing, the analyst must testify in person, meet the
requirements of an "unavailable" witness under Federal Rule of
Evidence 804, or the defendant must waive his objection to the
analyst's absence. 285 In his holding, Justice Scalia rejected the
Government's suggestion that the defense could have subpoenaed the
analysts if the defense wanted to ask them questions: "[T]he
Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present
its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses
into COurt.,,286 Justice Scalia remarked that the issue in this case was
straightforward and dictated by the ruling in Crawford: "The Sixth
Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex
parte out-of-court affidavits.,,287 The admission of the analysis of the
narcotics over the defense objection was reversible error. 288
Justice Scalia dissented from the ruling in Michigan v. Bryant that
the Confrontation Clause was not violated when a dying victim's
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

287.
288.

See Amy Karan et ai., Domestic Violence Courts: What Are They and How Should We
Manage Them?, 50 Juv. &FAM. CT. J. 75, 75-76 (1999).
See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REv. 747, 751-52
(2005).
See id. at 748-50.
129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
ld. at 2530-33; id. at 2543-44 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court sweeps away an
accepted rule governing the admission of scientific evidence.").
See id. at 2532, 2540-42 (majority opinion).
ld. at 2540. Justice Scalia continued, articulating the defendant's perspective: "[The
Confrontation Clause's] value to the defendant is not replaced by a system in which
the prosecution presents its evidence via ex parte affidavits and waits for the
defendant to subpoena the affiants ifhe chooses." ld.
ld. at 2542.
ld.
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statements were admitted under the excited utterance exception to the
Justice Scalia first criticizes the majority's
hearsay rule. 289
justification:
Today's tale-a story of five officers conducting
successive examinations of a dying man with the
primary purpose, not of obtaining and preserving his
testimony regarding his killer, but of protecting him,
them, and others from a murderer somewhere on the
loose-is so transparently false that professing to
believe it demeans this institution. 290
Justice Scalia's dissent further accused the majority of attempting
to overturn the Crawford line of cases, arguing that "perhaps as an
intended second goal-today's opinion distorts our Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in shambles.,,291
In its analysis, the Bryant case focused on the reliability of the
hearsay statements, which was the exact reasoning that the Court had
overruled in the Crawford decision. 292 Justice Scalia forcefully
dissented from the Bryant majority and asserted the rights of the
criminal defendant, despite the fact that without the victim's
statements the defendant may not have been convicted. 293 He further
reiterates his rejection of admitting statements without confrontation:
[W]e did not disavow multifactor balancing for
reliability in Crawford out of a preference for rules
over standards. We did so because it "d[id] violence
to" the Framers' design. It was judges' open-ended
determination of what was reliable that violated the
trial rights of Englishmen in the political trials of the
16th and 17th centuries . . . . . Not even the least
dangerous branch can be trusted to assess the
reliability of uncross-examined testimony in
politically charged trials or trials implicating threats to
national security. 294

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

131 s. Ct. 1143,1168 (2011).
ld.
ld.
ld. at 1174.
ld. at 1171-72.
ld. at 1176. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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Justice Scalia found that because the primary purpose of the police
questioning was obviously to catch and prosecute the defendant, the
statements were testimonial and inadmissible without crossexamination. 295
Justice Scalia's response to any concerns that these Confrontation
Clause decisions will negatively impact the prosecution demonstrates
that he is a staunch defender of the rights of the accused: "The
Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution of criminals more
burdensome, but that is equally true of the right to trial by jury and
the privilege against self-incrimination. The Confrontation Clauselike those other constitutional provisions-is binding, and we may
not disregard it at our convenience.,,296 Justice Scalia also brushed
aside concerns that requiring the laboratory analyst to testify will
overburden the criminal justice systern 297 as irrelevant to whether or
not the defendant is afforded his rights pursuant to the Constitution. 298
2. To Have the Assistance of Counsel for His Defense
Justice Scalia has also defended the right to counsel. In United
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, Justice Scalia wrote for the majority and
held that the defendant's right to an attorney of his choice is not
subject to a harmless-error analysis. 299 On appeal, the government
conceded that the district court erred when it denied Gonzalez-Lopez
the right to hire a specific attorney. 300 Justice Scalia held that the
right to counsel contains the right to have the attorney who the
defendant chooses when the defendant is paying. 301 Analogizing to
Crawford, which rejected the long line of cases that allow statements
not subject to cross-examination into evidence and thus depriving the
defendant of his right to confront witnesses,302 Justice Scalia stated
that when the right to counsel of choice is denied, the question does
not become, was the trial fair? Instead, the test remains, did the
defendant have the attorney he chose represent him?303
295. [d. at 1172.
296. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009).
297. "[T]here is no evidence that the criminal justice system has ground to a halt in the
States that, one way or another, empower a defendant to insist upon the analyst's
appearance attrial." [d. at 2541.
298. See id. at 2540-42.
299. 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006).
300. [d.
301. See id. at 144; cf Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (distinguishing from
right to choose attorney when counsel is court-appointed).
302. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
303. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146.
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Because Gonzalez-Lopez was not allowed his attorney of choice,
the district court committed reversible error 304 : "Where the right to be
assisted by counsel of one's choice is wrongly denied, therefore, it is
unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or prejudice inquiry to
establish a Sixth Amendment violation.,,305 While the dissent focused
on the fairness of the trial, Justice Scalia refused to join in that
discussion. Similar to Crawford, Justice Scalia argued that the
Constitution means at least what it says. 306
Justice Scalia forcefully dissented from the majority's ruling in
Indiana v. Edwards and posited that the mentally ill can be denied
their right to self-representation. 307
The Supreme Court had
previously held in Faretta v. California that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel also contains within it a right to self-representation 308
and in Godinez v. Moran that the test for competency to waive
counsel is the same as the standard for competence to stand trial. 309
However, the Edwards Court held that if mentally ill defendants are
competent to stand trial yet their mental illness makes them
incompetent to represent themselves at trial, then appointed counsel
can be forced upon them over their objection and can overrule any
decision the defendant makes concerning his own defense. 310
Justice Scalia considered this issue from the perspective of the
criminal defendant. He emphasized two objections to the majority's
decision to force defendants to accept representation.3\) First, this
decision strips the right to present a defense away from the accused
because the forced attorney can ignore the defendant's preferred
defense: "But to hold that a defendant may be deprived of the right to
make legal arguments for acquittal simply because a state-selected
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

ld. at 152.
ld. at 148.
See id. at 146.
554 U.S. 164, 167 (2008).
422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
509 U.S. 389,391 (1993).
Edwards, 544 U.S. at 167; see also Joanmarie lIaria Davoli, Physically Present, Yet
Mentally Absent, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. 313,315-17 (2009) (discussing problems

with the competency standard).
31l. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 179-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated,
The right reflects a "nearly universal conviction, on the part of our
people as well as our courts, that forcing a lawyer upon an
unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself
if he truly wants to do so. . .. [I]n the long history of British
criminal jurisprudence, there was only one tribunal that ever
adopted a practice of forcing counsel upon an unwilling defendant
in a criminal proceeding. The tribunal was the Star Chamber."
ld. at 182 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807,821).
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agent has made different arguments on his behalf is ... to 'imprison a
man in his privileges and call it the Constitution. ",312 Secondly,
Justice Scalia argued that the majority allows mentally ill defendants
to be treated as less equal under the law: "In singling out mentally ill
defendants for this treatment, the Court's opinion does not even have
the questionable virtue of being politically correct.,,313 Finally,
Justice Scalia noted that in the Edwards case itself, the forced
attorney did no better than the defendant could have done pro se: the
defendant was convicted despite the trial court's decision that the
defendant needed forced representation to save him from himself. 314
Both Gonzalez-Lopez and Edwards demonstrate that Justice
Scalia's impact on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel strongly
favors the accused. Both cases inject a realist's focus into the
criminal justice system by discussing how these situations will play
out in an actual courtroom. While the holdings discuss two separate
aspects of right to counsel, they both stress the importance of the
defendant's ability to make this decision, which is of paramount
importance to him or herself, as opposed to allowing the government,
which is already prosecuting him and judging him, to additionally
decide what is best for his defense. Such a perspective that so clearly
expresses the viewpoint of the accused is criminal-rights oriented.
3. By an Impartial Jury315

Justice Scalia dissented from the majority decision in Georgia v.
McCollum, which held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited a
defendant from utilizing peremptory challenges to strike jurors based
on race. 316 While McCollum certainly had the commendable goal of
Id. at 189 (quoting Adams v. U.S. ex reI. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942)).
Id.
See id. Justice Scalia wrote,
The facts of this case illustrate this point with the utmost
clarity. Edwards wished to take a self-defense case to the jury.
His counsel preferred a defense that focused on lack of intent.
Having been denied the right to conduct his own defense,
Edwards was convicted without having had the opportunity to
present to the jury the grounds he believed supported his
innocence.
Id.
315. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Justice Scalia finds that the Fifth Amendment Due Process
clause works in conjunction with the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial to require
jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 50910 (1995); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993).
316. 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992); Id. at 69 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
312.
313.
314.
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eliminating racial discrimination, Justice Scalia objected to both the
fiction of considering a defendant to be a "state actor,,3!7 for purposes
applying the Equal Protection Clause to him and also to the Court's
interference with the defendant's use of preemptory challenges 3 !8: "In
the interest .of promoting the supposedly greater good of race
relations in the society as a whole[,] ... we use the Constitution to
destroy the ages-old right of criminal defendants to exercise
peremptory challenges as they wish, to secure a jury that they
consider fair.,,319 Justice Scalia exhibited a profound understanding
of the issue in this case for the criminal defendant.
When exercising peremptory challenges, criminal defendants are
not acting for the state, despite the majority's ruling.320 To suggest
this to a criminal defendant would be absurd: In whose interests are
you exercising these strikes? Is it the government's? The least
legally learned criminal defendants understand that it is in their
interest, and theirs alone, to have jurors sympathetic to them on the
jury, and to remove jurors who may be hostile to them -even if there
is a slight chance the hostility stems from the juror's race. The irony
of the McCollum case is that prosecutors historically were the ones
using racially based strikes to discriminate against the criminal
defendant. 321 Justice Scalia's dissent explained the absurdity of
concluding that a criminal defendant used racially based strikes in a
manner to discriminate, instead of to benefit, the criminal
defendant. 322 Only the defendant's rights are at risk during a criminal
trial. 323
Justice Scalia's defense of the jury trial system also has included
his insistence that the jury make findings of guilt by the standard of
beyond a reasonable doubt. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held
that the Louisiana jury instruction on reasonable doube 24 was
317. Jd. at 70 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A criminal defendant, in the process of defending
himself against the state, is held to be acting on behalf of the state.").
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Jd. at 64-65 (O'Connor, 1., dissenting).
321. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 & n.3 (1986).
322. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 69-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
323. See id.
324. Here is the instruction:
If you entertain a reasonable doubt as to any fact or element
necessary to constitute the defendant's guilt, it is your duty to give
him the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of not guilty.
Even where the evidence demonstrates a probability of guilt, if it
does not establish such guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you must
acquit the accused. This doubt, however, must be a reasonable
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constitutionally flawed. 325 Writing for the majority three years later
in Sullivan v. Louisiana, Justice Scalia found that the exact same jury
instruction constituted reversible error in a case where the defendant
had been sentenced to death 326 : "The right to a trial by jury reflects,
we have said, 'a profound judgment about the way in which law
should be enforced and justice administered.' The deprivation of that
right ... unquestionably qualifies as 'structural error. ",327 Justice
Scalia emphasized that the jury must make findings beyond a
reasonable doubt in order for a verdict to be constitutionally valid 328 :
"But the essential connection to a 'beyond a reasonable doubt' factual
finding cannot be made where the instructional error consists of a
misdescription of the burden of proof, which vitiates all the jury's
findings." 329 Thus, Justice Scalia overturned a death sentence
because of an improper burden of proof instruction without
expressing any concern that he was enabling a defendant who was
probably guilty to escape a death sentence.
Similarly, United States v. Gaudin 330 reiterated the Court's position
that the Fifth Amendment due process rights combined with the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial "require criminal convictions to rest
upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every
element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable
doubt.,,331 Rejecting three arguments by the government to the
contrary, Justice Scalia made the constitutional issue in Gaudin seem
both obvious and simple: "The Constitution gives a criminal
defendant the right to demand that a jury find him guilty of all the
elements of the crime with which he is charged; one of the elements
in the present case is materiality; respondent therefore had a right to

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

one; that is one that is founded upon a real tangible substantial
basis and not upon mere caprice and conjecture. It must be such
doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your
mind by reasons of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence or
lack thereof. A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It
is an actual substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable man
can seriously entertain. What is required is not an absolute or
mathematical certainty, but a moral certainty.
State v. Cage, 554 So.2d 39, 41 (La. 1989) (emphasis added).
Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39,41 (1990) (per curiam).
508 U.S. 275,278 (1993).
Id. at 281-82 (citation omitted) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155
(1968)).
Id. at 278.
Id. at 281.
515 U.S. 506 (1995).
Id. at 510 (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1993)).
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have the jury decide materiality.,,332 Because the trial court withheld
from the jury the issue of materiality of Gaudin's false statements and
made that finding by itself, Gaudin's conviction was reversed. 333
Justice Scalia revisited the issue of jury determination of guilt and
dissented from the majority opinion in Almendarez-Torres v. United
States. 334 The majority held that a statute authorizing an increased
sentence for an aggravating element was merely a sentencing factor
that did not need to be considered by the jury. 335
The approach used by Justice Scalia in Gaudin reappeared in
Apprendi v. New Jersey. 336 The majority found that the prosecutor
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when
the prosecutor filed a motion alleging new facts after the defendant
had entered a guilty plea, which enhanced the defendant's death
penalty sentence. 337 The Court held that any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other
than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 338
In his Apprendi concurrence, Justice Scalia reminded the Court of
the origins of the right to a jury trial: "Judges, it is sometimes
necessary to remind ourselves, are part of the State.... The
founders of the American Republic were not prepared to leave
[criminal justice] to the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee
was one of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. ,,339
Justice Scalia found that the right to a jury trial necessitates that the
jury make any findings that result in a verdict or enhance a sentence:
And the guarantee that "in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to ... trial, by an impartial
jury," has no intelligible content unless it means that all the
facts which must exist in order to subject the defendant to a
legally prescribed punishment must be found by the jury. 340
Once again, Justice Scalia articulated the most pro-defense position
of all the Justices: if a jury cannot make a finding beyond a

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Jd. at 511.
Id. at 522-23.
523 U.S. 224,248 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Jd. at 226 (majority opinion).
530 U.S. 466, 476-77 (2000).
Id. at 470-71, 475-76.
Id. at 475-76.
Jd. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).
!d. at 499 (alteration in original).
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reasonable doubt that a specific factor exists, then a judge cannot
consider that factor when imposing a sentence. 341
Perhaps Justice Scalia's strongest defense of the right to a jury trial,
as well as his loudest condemnation of the erosion of that right, came
in his concurrence in the case Ring v. Arizona. 342 The majority in
Ring held that the jury, not the judge, must find the existence of
aggravating factors in a death penalty case. 343 Justice Scalia wrote
separately, giving as one of his rationales the following:
[M]y observing over the past 12 years the accelerating
propensity of both state and federal legislatures to adopt
"sentencing factors" determined by judges that increase
punishment beyond what is authorized by the jury's verdict,
and my witnessing the belief of a near majority of my
colleagues that this novel practice is perfectly OK, cause me
to believe that our people's traditional belief in the right of
trial by jury is in perilous decline. That decline is bound to
be confirmed, and indeed accelerated, by the repeated
spectacle of a man's going to his death because a judge
found that an aggravating factor existed. We cannot
preserve our veneration for the protection of the jury in
criminal cases if we render ourselves callous to the need for
that protection by regularly imposing the death penalty
without it. 344
Justice Scalia's position seems extraordinary, given his earlier
writings concerning the legitimacy of the death penalty. 345 For
Justice Scalia, the death penalty's legitimacy derives from the
legislature and from the imposition of it by a jury, but never from
judicial power. 346
Writing for the majority in Blakely v. Washington, Justice Scalia
reaffIrmed the accused's right to a jury trial. 347 After pleading guilty
to second-degree kidnapping of his wife, an additional three years
were added to the defendant's sentence when a judge found the

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

ld. at 498-99.
536 U.S. 584,610-14 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
ld. at 609 (majority opinion).
ld. at 611-12 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
See discussion supra Part II.A.
See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text; see also Ring, 536 U.S. at 611-12
(Scalia, J., concurring).
347. 542 U.S. 296, 305-06, 313-14 (2004).
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aggravating factor of "deliberate cruelty.,,348 The second-degree
kidnapping charge did not include the element of deliberate cruelty,
and the defendant objected to the trial judge making that finding after
the guilty plea. 349 Pursuant to the holding in Apprendi, the Court
reversed Blakely's conviction because a judge, and not a jury, made
findings as to the aggravating factor that enhanced the defendant's
sentence. 350
In Blakely, Justice Scalia not only reviewed the history of the right
to a jury trial, but he also responded to his critics who alleged that
Apprendi negatively impacts criminal defendants.
Referencing
history, Justice Scalia stressed that "[j]ust as suffrage ensures the
people's ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches,
jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary."351 Justice
Scalia argued that ensuring that the jury must make findings beyond a
reasonable doubt prior to sentencing enhancement does not
negatively impact criminal defendants: "When a defendant pleads
guilty, the State is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements so
long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents
to judicial factfinding.,,352 Justice Scalia thus asserted that the plea
bargaining power of the defendant is not harmed and may even be
strengthened by the reasoning or the holdings in Apprendi and
Blakely. 353

348. Id. at 299-300.
349. Id. at 298-300.
350. Id. at 301, 303-05.
351. Id. at 306. Ressponding to Justice Breyer's dissent, the majority via Justice Scalia
assereds that Apprendi does not harm the defendant's position in plea bargaining, and
anyway,
the Sixth Amendment was not written for the benefit of those who
choose to forgo its protection. It guarantees the right to jury trial.
It does not guarantee that a particular number of jury trials will
actually take place. That more defendants elect to waive that right
(because, for example, the government at the moment is not
particularly oppressive) does not prove that a constitutional
provision guaranteeing availability of that option is disserved.
Id. at 312.
352. Id. at 310.
353. Justice Scalia wrote,
The implausibility of Justice Breyer's contention that Apprendi
is unfair to criminal defendants is exposed by the lineup of amici
in this case. It is hard to believe that the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers was somehow duped into arguing for
the wrong side. Justice Breyer's only authority asking that
defendants be protected from Apprendi is an article written not by
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These cases interpreting the Sixth Amendment benefit criminal
defendants because they view the trial through the eyes of the
criminal defendant. Justice Scalia's holdings in the area of Sixth
Amendment law have widespread impact. His Confrontation Clause
cases ensure that a defendant's objections to hearsay will be tested,
not only under evidentiary hearsay exceptions, but under the more
demanding rules barring admission of out-of-court testimonial
statements.
These rulings significantly impact widely and routinely prosecuted
crimes such as narcotics violations and driving while intoxicated
cases. Indeed, until fiscal year 2009, cases involving narcotics
charges were the most common type of case currently prosecuted in
federal court. 354 Justice Scalia deferred to defendants' choice in the
area of assistance of counsel, demanding that criminal defendants be
afforded their constitutional rights. 355 Finally, Justice Scalia's rulings
on the right to a jury trial have contributed to the powerful decline 356
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and have given defendants the
power of knowledge: no longer do they plead guilty to one crime and
get sentenced for another. A jury must make that decision, unless a
defendant stipulates to such additional facts.357
B. Double Jeopardy

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service
in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to
a criminal defense lawyer but by a law professor and fonner
prosecutor.
!d. at 312. Justice Scalia continues his approach in his dissent in United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005), arguing that the majority's opinion disregarded the historical practice
of "having juries find the facts that expose a defendant to increased prison time." ld. at 304
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
354. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR
2009, at 5 (2010), available at http:/www.ussc.govlResearchlResearch]ublicationsi
2010/20101230JY09_OverviewJederal_Criminal_Cases.pdf.
355. See supra Part IIl.A.2.
356. See Marc Miller, Rehabilitating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 JUDICATURE
180, 180--81 (1995).
357. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310.
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be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just
compensation. 358
Justice Scalia wrote the decision in United States v. Dixon, finding
the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar prosecution of an underlying
criminal charge once a defendant had been convicted of criminal
contempt for violating a civil protection order. 359 The Dixon 360 case
split the court between those Justices who asserted that double
jeopardy never bars such prosecutions and those who felt all
subsequent prosecutions were barred. 361 Justice Scalia wrote that
criminal charges may be prosecuted after a criminal conviction for
violation of a civil protection only when they have different
elements. 362
Justice Scalia noted that the "same-elements test... inquires
whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other;
if not, they are the 'same offence' and double jeopardy bars
additional punishment and successive prosecution.,,363 While some
of the dissenting Justices argued that Justice Scalia did not protect the
rights of the accused against retrial,364 this decision essentially
expanded double jeopardy protections. 365 For example, defendant
Dixon was convicted of contempt of court for violating his bail

358. u.s. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
359. 509 U.s. 688, 692-93, 696 (1993).
360. The Dixon case also overruled Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), a case from
which Justice Scalia dissented. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 689; Grady, 495 U.S. at 526
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
361. Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and White agreed that the Double Jeopardy
Clause barred prosecution of the criminal charges underlying the criminal contempt
conviction. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696-700; Jd. at 730 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Jd. at 743-44 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Thomas, and Blackmun dissented
from the majority as to that holding. Jd. at 714 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("[A]s a general matter, double jeopardy does not bar a
subsequent prosecution based on conduct for which a defendant has been held in
criminal contempt."); Jd. at 741 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
362. "Applying the [same-elements test], the result is clear: These crimes were different
offenses and the subsequent prosecution did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause."
Jd. at 701-02 (majority opinion).
363. Id. at 697.
364. Id. at 733-40 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
365. See id. at 691,704,707-11 (majority opinion).
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release conditions. 366 His violation was being arrested for possession
with intent to distribute cocaine. 367 After being convicted of the bail
release violation, the Court held he could not be charged with the far
more serious crime of possession with intent to distribute. 368 Dixon's
sentence for the contempt charge was 180 days in jail. 369 Had he
been tried and subsequently convicted of the underlying criminal
charge, he would have faced a sentence of many years in prison. 370
Justice Scalia emphasized the process of the contempt proceeding:
At the show-cause hearing [for violation of terms of bail
release], four police officers testified to facts surrounding
the alleged drug offense; Dixon's counsel cross-examined
these witnesses and introduced other evidence. The court
concluded that the Government had established "'beyond a
reasonable doubt that [Dixon] was in possession of drugs
and that those drugs were possessed with the intent to
distribute. '" The court therefore found Dixon guilty of
criminal contempt[,] . . . which allows contempt sanctions
after expedited proceedings without a jury. 371
Justice Scalia thus demonstrated that the contempt hearing followed
the same procedure and found the exact same facts that a jury in a
criminal trial would have to find in order to convict Dixon of the
criminal charge. 372 Because the government chose to proceed with
the show-cause hearing on the contempt charge that carried a minor
penalty, it had to forgo any further prosecution of the defendant for
the more serious crimes with the same elements that would have
resulted in a much harsher penalty. 373
Justice Rehnquist dissented and articulated the pro-prosecution
viewpoint that Justice Scalia's decision rejected the rule that "double
jeopardy does not bar a subsequent prosecution based on conduct for
which a defendant has been held in criminal contempt. . .. [because]
contempt of court has different elements than the substantive criminal
charges in this case[,] ... they are separate offenses.,,374 While
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Id. at 691-92.
Id. at 69l.
Id. at 691-92.
Id. at 692 (citing D.C. CODE § 23-1329(c) (1989)).
Id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing D.C. CODE § 33-541(a)(2)(A) (1989)).
Id. at 691-92 (majority opinion) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).
See id. at 698-700.
Id. at 698,700; see also id. at 718 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 714 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia's holding does not prevent another trial after every
criminal contempt hearing,375 it has a positive impact on the rights of
criminal defendants because bail violation hearings, which occur
frequently, often involve allegations of new criminal behavior. 376
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects criminal defendants who have
their bond revoked and a contempt sentence imposed against them
from being tried for crimes for which they have already been
punished. 377
Another double jeopardy case, Smith v. Massachusetts,378 is as
much interesting for the unusual coalition of Justices agreeing that a
Double Jeopardy Clause violation occurred 379 as it is for its positive
impact on the rights of criminal defendants. Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia held that once a trial judge acquits a defendant of one
criminal charge during a trial on several different counts, the judge
may not reverse that holding and reinstate the charge. 380 While the
dissent viewed the trial judge's change of mind as correcting an error
that did not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause,381 Justice Scalia
demonstrated an understanding for and sympathy to the defendant's
situation: "In all jurisdictions . . . false assurance of acquittal on one
count may induce the defendant to present defenses to the remaining

375.

376.

377.
378.
379.

380.
381.

See id. at 713 (noting that the majority's decision does not prohibit subsequent
prosecutions for some of the charges of Foster, the Dixon companion case, following
the criminal contempt hearing).
See Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection from Successive Prosecution: A
Proposed Approach, 92 GEO. L.J. 1183, 1277, 1280-81 (2004) (discussing how some
contempt charges may limit further prosecution of the defendant); Melissa Wdss,
Note, Interpreting Searches of Pretrial Releases Through the Lens of the Fourth
Amendment Special Needs Exception, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 363, 374-75 (2006)
(discussing the rise in public concern over a connection between defendants released
on bail and crime).
Dixon, 509 U.S. at 697,700.
543 U.S. 462 (2005).
Justices joining Justice Scalia in the majority: Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and
Thomas. Justices joining Justice Ginsburg in dissent: Rehnquist, Kennedy, and
Breyer. Id.
Id. at 473.
Justice Ginsburg wrote,
[The defendant] was subjected to a single, unbroken trial
proceeding in which he was denied no opportunity to air his
defense before presentation of the case to the jury. I would not
deny prosecutors in such circumstances, based on a trial judge's
temporary error, one full and fair opportunity to present the
State's case.
Id. at 480 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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counts that are inadvisable-for example, a defense that entails
admission of guilt on the acquitted count.,,382
As Justice Scalia recognized, once the judge acquits the defendant
on one count after the prosecution's presentation of its case, the
defendant presents his defense relying on that acquittal as he
formulates trial strategy regarding which witnesses to present and
what arguments to make. 383 Justice Scalia explained that "[t]he
Double Jeopardy Clause's guarantee cannot be allowed to become a
potential snare for those who reasonably rely upon it. If, after a
facially unqualified midtrial dismissal of one count, the trial has
proceeded to the defendant's introduction of evidence, the acquittal
must be treated as final .... ,,384 While this decision may prevent the
trial court from fixing its mistakes, the dissent was only concerned
with allowing the trial court to fix mistakes to further benefit the
prosecution. 385 Justice Scalia ensured that the defendant's rights
were protected. He expressed no interest in fixing the prosecutor's
mistakes 386 : "Requiring someone to defend against a charge of which
he has already been acquitted is prejudice per se for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause--even when the acquittal was erroneous
because the evidence was sufficient. ,,387 Justice Scalia recognized
that this holding requires that even if a defendant is guilty, the
Double Jeopardy Clause prevents prosecution, thus favorably
impacting the rights of criminal defendants.
Justice Scalia had previously issued a similarly demanding defense
of the defendant's double jeopardy rights in his dissent in Jones v.
Thomas. 388 The majority in Jones treated the defendant's claim
dismissively because the defendant was clearly guilty, and the
Missouri court corrected the mistake by imposing a sentence that
Id. at 472 (majority opinion).
Id. at 472 n.6.
Id. at 473.
Id. at 473 n.7.
Justice Scalia wrote,
Moreover, a prosecutor can seek to persuade the court to correct its legal error
before it rules, or at least before the proceedings move forward. Indeed, the
prosecutor in this case convinced the judge to reconsider her acquittal ruling on
the basis of legal authority he had obtained during a IS-minute recess before
closing arguments. Had he sought a short continuance at the time of the
acquittal motion, the matter could have been resolved satisfactorily before
petitioner went forward with his case.
Id. at 474-75 (citations omitted).
387. Id. at 473 n.7.
388. 491 U.S. 376, 389 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
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seemed appropriate for the severity of the crime. 389 The majority felt
that to find otherwise would be giving the defendant a benefit he did
not deserve 390: "But neither the Double Jeopardy Clause nor any
other constitutional provision exists to provide unjustified
windfalls."391
Justice Scalia dissented and, in an unexpected manner, argued that
the Double Jeopardy Clause does in fact exist to provide such
windfalls:
The Double Jeopardy Clause is and has always been, not a
provision designed to assure reason and justice in the
particular case, but the embodiment of technical,
prophylactic rules that require the Government to turn
square comers. Whenever it is applied to release a criminal
deserving of punishment it frustrates justice in the particular
case, but for the greater purpose of assuring repose in the
totality of criminal prosecutions and sentences. . .. With
technical rules, above all others, it is imperative that we
adhere strictly to what we have stated the rules to be. A
technical rule with equitable exceptions is no rule at all.
Three strikes is out. The State broke the rules here, and
must abide by the result. 392
Once again, Justice Scalia's interpretation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause is absolute, even when the results interfere with law
enforcement and prosecution. Justice Scalia does not hide behind an
idealistic view of criminals or the criminal justice system. Instead, he
confronts the reality that following the rules may result in releasing
the guilty and asserts that such results are exactly what are intended
by a system designed to protect the innocent.

C. Rule ofLenity/Strict construction
As noted in Justice Scalia's pro-prosecution cases, he often decides
a case based on the procedures of the criminal justice system. 393
Where the process benefits the accused, such as the rule of lenity,394

389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

Id. at 381-82 (majority opinion).
Jd. at 382 n.2.
Id. at 387.
Jd. at 396 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Kannar, supra note 4, at 1321.
When a law is unclear, "we adhere to the familiar rule that 'where there is ambiguity
in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant.'" Smith v. United
States, 508 U.S. 223, 246 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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Justice Scalia follows the rule and finds for the defendant; where the
process does not favor either the prosecution or the defense, Justice
Scalia's decisions will favorably impact the defendant when
appropriate. 395 Justice Scalia does not flinch from upholding the
rights of the defendant when he finds he must do so in order to follow
the law.
Justice Scalia applied the rule of lenity in United States v. Santos,
and writing for the majority, held that the ambiguous term proceeds
in the statute must be interpreted in favor of the defendant. 396 Justice
Scalia defended the rule of lenity:
This venerable rule not only vindicates the fundamental
principle that no citizen should be held accountable for a
violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain, or
subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed. It
also places the weight of inertia upon the party that can best
induce Congress to speak more clearly .... 397
In his explanation, Justice Scalia emphasized the difficulty of

interpreting poorly drafted statutes: "When interpreting a criminal
statute, we do not play the part of a mind reader.,,398 Thus, while
Justice Scalia is ruling for the defendant, his larger point is that
legislatures need to write laws that everyone can understand and
follow. He implicitly scolded the government for suggesting that the
Court clear up ambiguities in the law to the prosecution's benefit:
"We interpret ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of defendants, not
prosecutors." 399
Quite often, Justice Scalia dissented from majority opinions
precisely because the Court failed to follow the rule of lenity. For
example, in Smith v. United States,400 Justice Scalia dissented from
the holding that the exchange of a gun for narcotics satisfied the
element of "use" of the firearm during and "in relation to" drug
trafficking. 401 Justice Scalia ridiculed such an interpretation of the
word use, because the legislature clearly intended to punish
individuals who used a firearm as a weapon during narcotics

395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

!d.
553 u.s. 507, 514 (2008).
ld. at 514.
ld. at 515.
ld. at 519.
508 U.S. 223 (1993).
See id. at 241-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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offenses. 402 "It would also be reasonable and normal to say that he
'used' [the MAC-lO] to scratch his head. When one wishes to
describe the action of employing the instrument of a firearm for such
unusual purposes, 'use' is assuredly a verb one could select. ,,403
However, the legislature obviously did not mean to punish defendants
who happened to scratch their heads with a firearm during a narcotics
offense through imposition of this statute anymore than the
legislature meant to punish this specific defendant who traded his
fireann for drugs. Even if the word use in the statue was ambiguous,
Justice Scalia would have reversed the conviction pursuant to the rule
of lenity. 404
Justice Scalia again applied the rule of lenity and dissented from
the holding in Bryan v. United States. 405 The majority found that the
defendant's conviction for willfully violating the statute was valid
even if the defendant was not aware of the licensing requirement he
violated. 406 Justice Scalia found that there was no evidence
demonstrating that the defendant knew he was violating the law and
therefore wrote that the rule of lenity should have resulted in reversal
of the conviction. 407 Recognizing the complexity of the modern
criminal justice system, Justice Scalia found the rule of lenity to have
enhanced importance: "In our era of mUltiplying new federal crimes,
there is more reason than ever to give this ancient canon of
construction consistent application .... ,,408
In Holloway v. United States 409 and James v. United States, 4\0
Justice Scalia applied the rule of lenity and argued that the defendants
should not have been convicted in either case. 411 In Holloway, Justice
Scalia expressed the pro-defense viewpoint when he dissented from a
decision written by Justice Stevens, who wrote from the proprosecution perspective.412 Holloway held that the intent requirement
(to seriously harm or kill the driver) of a carjacking statute is satisfied
by evidence of the defendant's conditional intent to harm the driver if

402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

ld. at 246.
ld. at 242-43.
See id. at 244-46.
524 U.S. 184,205 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
ld. at 199 n.33 (majority opinion).
ld. at 202-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
ld. at 205.
526 U.S. I (1999).
550 U.S. 192 (2007).
ld. at 219 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Holloway, 526 U.S. at 20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See 526 U.S. at 20 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 12 (majority opinion)
(rejecting Justice Scalia's application of the rule oflenity in favor of the defendant).
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necessary to steal the car.4l3 Justice Scalia argued that when the
statute requires that the defendant act "with the intent to cause death
or serious bodily harm," conditional intent does not satisfy this mens
rea. 414 Justice Scalia criticized the majority for misinterpreting the
law simply to punish the defendant's behavior, despite the fact that
the defendant lacked the necessary intent. 415
Justice Scalia emphasized that defendant Holloway specifically did
not want to seriously harm or kill the driver because Holloway
wanted the driver to give up the car upon demand. 416 His mens rea
was the opposite of the intent necessary for conviction under the
statute, and Justice Scalia objected to the Court's consideration of
conditional intent: "It is difficult enough to determine a defendant's
actual intent; it is infinitely more difficult to determine what the
defendant planned to do upon the happening of an event that the
defendant hoped would not happen . . . .,,417 Justice Scalia invoked
the rule of lenity as an alternative and stated that "[if] the statue is
not, as I think, clear in the defendant's favor, it is at the very least
ambiguous and the defendant must be given the benefit of the
doubt.,,418
The majority in James held that the Florida conviction of attempted
burglary satisfied the violent-felony element in a federal statute. 419
Justice Scalia dissented and argued that attempted burglary does not
satisfy the element because otherwise it is impossible to know
whether one is in violation of the law 420 : "The rule of lenity,
grounded in part on the need to give "'fair warning'" of what is
encompassed by a criminal statute demands that we give this text the
more narrow reading of which it is susceptible.,,421 Justice Scalia
focused on ensuring that the law clearly indicated what is prohibited,
not on ensuring that criminal defendants are convicted. 422
Justice Scalia applied the rule of scienter in his dissent from the
child pornography case of United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. 423
The majority held that the term knowingly applied to the elements of
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

ld. at 12.
ld. at 12-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994 & Supp. III».
ld.
ld. at 12.
ld. at 19.
ld. at 21.
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 195 (2007).
ld. at 214, 216, 225 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
ld. at 219 (citation omitted).
ld. at 215-16.
513 U.S. 64, 80 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the crime despite the fact that to do so made no grammatical sense. 424
To rule otherwise would have meant that the defendant's conviction
would have been reversed, because if Congress omitted a scienter
requirement, then the statute violates the Constitution and is
unenforceable. 425 Justice Scalia criticized the Court for upholding the
conviction instead of ruling that the statute was fatally flawed: "The
Court today saves a single conviction by putting in place a relatively
toothless child-pornography law that Congress did not enact.,,426
Justice Scalia's use of strict construction of statutes also benefits
criminal defendants. In Johnson v. United States,427 Justice Scalia
wrote that in order to determine whether a prior conviction is a
violent felony for sentencing-enhancement purposes in federal court,
a court must look to whether the prior conviction was considered
violent in the jurisdiction where the defendant was convicted. 428
Thus, although the common law considered the conviction to be
violent, Justice Scalia found that the defendant's prior battery
conviction under Florida law was not a violent felony. 429 Because it
was not a violent felony, the sentence could not be enhanced under
the federal law. 430
Similarly, in United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno,431 Justice Scalia
dissented from the majority's ruling that the venue in a kidnapping
and firearm conviction was properly found, even though the
defendant did not possess a firearm in that jurisdiction. 432 Justice
Scalia argued that the case was tried in the wrong jurisdiction and
that the conviction could not stand:
The short of the matter is that this defendant, who has a
constitutional right to be tried in the State and district where
his alleged crime was "committed," has been prosecuted for
using a gun during a kidnapping in a State and a district
where all agree he did not use a gun during a kidnapping. If
to state this case is not to decide it, the law has departed
424. Id. at 68-69, 77-78 (majority opinion).
425. As Justice Scalia explains, the statute is unconstitutional because "by imposing
criminal liability upon those not knowingly dealing in pornography, it establishes a
severe deterrent, not narrowly tailored to its purposes, upon fully protected First
Amendment activities." Id. at 86 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
426. Id. at 87.
427. 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010).
428. Id. at 1269-70.
429. Id. at 1271-72, 1274.
430. Id. at 1268-74.
43l. 526 U.S. 275 (1999).
432. Id. at 282-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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further from the meaning of language than is appropriate for
a government that is supposed to rule (and to be restrained)
through the written word. 433
Justice Scalia once again defended the right of the criminal defendant
to be convicted only for the crime he has actually committed. He
strenuously objected to the Court's distortion of the facts in order to
uphold this conviction.
In United States v. Resendiz-Ponce,434 Justice Scalia dissented from
the majority's holding that an indictment alleging attempted illegal
reentry into the country did not need to specifically allege an overt
act. 435 Justice Scalia argued that the defect constituted reversible
error because "the Government was required to state not only that
Resendiz-Ponce 'knowingly and intentionally attempted to enter the
United States of America,' but also that he 'took a substantial step'
toward that end.,,436 An indictment that does not allege the elements
of the offense should not stand. 437
Justice Scalia vigorously dissented from a case that punished
behavior that was not a crime at the time of the act. In Rogers v.
Tennessee, 438 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a defendant
by allowing the Tennessee court to retroactively abolish the common
law "year and a day rule.,,439 Justice Scalia vigorously dissented and
argued that the majority violated the Ex Post Facto Clause 440 : "To
begin with, let us be clear that the law here was altered after the fact.
Petitioner ... was innocent of murder under the law as it stood at the
time of the stabbing, because the victim did not die until after a year
and a day had passed.,,441 Justice Scalia reviewed the history of the
Due Process Clause and the prohibition against ex post facto laws
and further emphasized that the goal of those provisions is to give
notice (or fair warning) of what is against the law. 442 Justice Scalia

433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.

Id. at 285 (citations omitted).
549 U.S. 102 (2007).
Id. at 117 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 107 (majority opinion).
Id. at 116 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 108 (majority opinion).
532 U.S. 451 (2001).
Id. at 453. "At common law, the year and a day rule provided that no defendant could
be convicted of murder unless his victim had died by the defendant's act within a year
and a day of that act." Id.
440. Id. at 467-71, 478 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
441. Id. at 468.
442. Id. at 470.
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objected to the unfairness of retroactively changing the law to apply
against this defendant.
D. Fourth Amendment

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affIrmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 443
Justice Scalia wrote several Fourth Amendment decisions that
favorably impact the rights of criminal defendants in the context of
home searches. In Arizona v. Hicks,444 Justice Scalia wrote for the
majority and found that a police officer violated the "plain view"
exception to the Warrant Clause when he moved stereo equipment to
find and record its serial number. 445 Although the officer was
lawfully on the premises of the home in response to exigent
circumstances, the Court held that the offIcer needed probable cause
in order to search the equipment without a warrant. 446 Even though
the equipment itself was plainly visible to the officers, there was
nothing incriminating about the equipment. 447 The offIcer could not
seize the equipment until he searched it for the serial number
information and then investigated with that number to determine that
the equipment had been stolen. 448
Justice Scalia's decision rejected the suggestion that such a search
was merely a cursory inspection that is justifiable under a reasonable
suspicion standard. 449 He further expressed no concern about any
negative impact on police investigation: "It may well be that, in such
circumstances, no effective means short of a search exist. But there
is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes
insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us
all.,,450

u.s. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
480 U.S. 321 (1987).
Id. at 325.
Id. at 326-27.
Id. at 324 (explaining that the stereo had to be moved to find the incriminating
numbers, which was outside the exigency).
448. Id. at 323.
449. Id. at 328-29.
450. Id. at 329.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
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In Kyllo v. United States, 451 Justice Scalia again protected the

sanctity of the home against governmental intrusion. Police aimed a
thermal imaging device at defendant Kyllo's home, which indicated
that parts of the home were relatively hotter than other parts of the
home. 452 Using the information gained from the thermal imaging
device, the police obtained and executed a search warrant and
discovered more than 100 marijuana plants being grown inside
Kyllo's house. 453
The Court held that the scanning of the home with the thermal
imaging device was a search under the Fourth Amendment and thus
the police should have obtained a warrant prior to the scan. 454 Justice
Scalia wrote that '''[a]t the very core of the Fourth Amendment
stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. ",455 The Court was
challenged with applying the constitutional rules from a previous era
to new technology that enables the user to view inside a home. In the
holding, Justice Scalia explained that a search using a device that sees
inside a house and is not in general public-use requires a warrant. 456
This result is dictated by the fact that the "Fourth Amendment draws
a firm line at the entrance to the house. That line ... must be not only
firm but also bright-which requires clear specification of those
methods of surveillance that require a warrant. ,,457
N. CONCLUSION

Perhaps it is too simplistic to note that the impact of Justice
Scalia's decisions may be more positive for criminal defendants
precisely because the Constitution itself favors the rights of criminal
defendants against the power of the government. The drafters of the
Constitution feared an oppressive, powerful government that would
strip away the rights of the people. 458 Thus, a Justice who subscribes
to originalism is a Justice whose decisions must positively impact
criminal defendants in the area of constitutional criminal procedure.
Specifically, Justice Scalia wants the criminal defendant to have
what the Constitution gives him-but no more. He objects when the
45l.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.

533 u.s. 27 (2001).
Id. at 30.
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
!d. at 40.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
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Court tries to write new procedures or new protections into the
Constitution. However in many areas, such as his decisions
concerning the rule of lenity and strict construction, Justice Scalia
takes the defendant's point of view and argues vigorously for the
rights of the defendant against the power of the government. 459
Justice Scalia acknowledges that his approach to constitutional
jurisprudence may limit the power of the prosecution to convict, but
he neither denies such a result nor does he twist the rule of law to .
protect government power. He does not allow a favorable result for a
criminal defendant to influence his understanding of the law and thus
applies the law fairly. Characteristic of his approach, he recognizes
that sometimes witnesses do not appear for trial, thereby destroying
the government's ability to prosecute: "When this occurs, the
Confrontation Clause gives the criminal a windfall. We may not,
however, vitiate constitutional guarantees when they have the effect
of allowing the guilty to go free.,,460

459. See supra Part III.C.
460. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) (emphasis omitted).

